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Efficiency as a Standard in Capital Market Law -
The Application of Empirical and Economic Arguments 
for the Justification of Civil Law, Criminal Law and 
Administrative Law Sanctions 
THOMAS M. J. MÖLLERS* 
I. lntroduction 
a. Empirical Dma fvr rhe U.S. and German Sec:urities ,\-/arket 
In r~ccnt years. a serics oJ scandals has causcd thc U .S. sccuritics markct to shut-
tcr: Enron, WorldCom as weil as Tyco International arc among the most famous 
- or bettcr said infamaus - cxamplcs. To avoid a worldwidc cconomic crisis such 
as last ccntury's so-callcd Black Friday at thc end of thc 1920's;. thc Amcrican 
kgislaturc rcactcd quickly and by 2002 passcd thc Sarbancs-Oxky Act with exten-
sive fcderal mcasurcs to improvc transparcncy and invcstor protcction.2 Companics 
must now commission an outside audit committcc.-' Thc chicf cxccutivc officcr 
(CEO) and chicf tinancial offteer {CFO) must swcar a .. balance sh..:ct l>ath '' 
a written confirmation that thcy havc fumishcd thc Sccuri tics anJ Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) with rcports that corrcdly and complctcly express thc tinancial statc 
of thc company."' lncorrcct rcpons arc punished by up to twenty ycars in prison.' 
A fcdcral judgc scntenccd thc cx-WorldCom lnc. Chief Ex~cutivc ßcmard J. Ebbcr!l 
to 25 ycars. as weil as Ty..:o dircctor Dcnnis Kozlowski anJ thc prcvious CFO Mark 
Swartz . ~> 
• Prof. Dr. Thl>ma:. M.J. ~töllcrs hl>lds a Chair for C1'>"1l Law, b:onom11.: l.aw. Europ~an L:1''· 
Contli~.:ts of Law anc.l Comp<Jrauvc Law anc.l has a kan.~tunnct·Ch<llf tor Corpurate. Cap1tal \tark~.:: 
& l'ompctition Law at thl! Univcrsity of Augsburg Fa~.:ul!y of Law: cnmil: thomas.mo..:lh:r~ta jur:t .UIII· 
augsburg.dc. homcpagc: www.thornas-mocllcr:;.de. 
1 t:or this 1-"ric.lay. thc 25th of O..:tobc:r. 1929. ~f. Jlcnning. 1n l'ohl, Ut•ut . .;ch,· /Jorwnge.,·t ·hichr.-
1 I'N2). pp 209. ::!47: Mcrkt. in llopt!Rudolph.d3aum, Blir.>t•nrt~/ium II YIJ7). pp 17. IJ7 d :-.'N 
: Public A~.:counting R..:fornl anJ lnvcstor Protc..:tion A..:t. l,ub.L. No . 107-204 from 7.30.201.!2 . 
I I b Stat. 745 (2002). wtw:h w:1s nam.:d a..:wrding to its 1wo au1ho~. Senat ur Paul Sarbancs unJ Con· 
grcssrnan Mi~.:had G. Oxlcy, ··sarban.:s·Oxky Act" (SOX). Thc A~.:t ~o::tn ~ fuunJ unJ.:r \\WW ~cc . !_!m · 
abllutilaws. soa2002.pdf ;.~nJ w~ w .thomas-mud krs.JI!fmat..:rial icn. 
' Sec. 301 SOX A..:t (fn . 2). 
' For Scc. 302 SOX Act (fn. 2) :~nJ S.:o.: 9Uo SOX AL:~ a:. § 1350 U.S.C. cf. Gr11.wn t•:ul~tu ·J.. :\<.i 
(200]), 304. 401 0.:1 Sl)4 . 
' Sec. •)06 SOX (Fn. 2} as ~ 1350 c) (2) U.S.C.; lh:t~·mMtl. JZ 1200--'J. p IX .:1 S44· 
' ln 1hc Enron mauer. Jctrr.:y SkiiiJng aml Kcnn.:th Lay w~:r..: fuunJ g01lty un alt a..:~.:ounts . kllr.:: 
Skilling was s.:ntcnccd to 24 y.:ars anJ 4 monlhs in pri:~on 011 thl.' 2JrJ of Octubcr. 2110f>. K..:nn.:th La~ 
di..:J .;hortly thcrcalt.:r. 
243 
244 TIIOMAS M.J . MöLLERS 
ln Gcrmany. a scrics of scandals also arosc: black shccp such as lnfomatcc, 
Comroad and EM.TV wcre "gleaming" with inaccuratc.: ad hoc publications and 
scmiannual rcports. 7 With morc than scventccn thousand claimants, Deutsche Tele-
kom is anticipating Gcrmany's largcst lawsuit bccausc of an inaccuratc real cstatc 
appraisal bctorc its third rccapitalization in 2000.11 Howcvcr, insufficicnt commu-
nication policics of listcd companies wcrc not thc onty thing to comc undcr tire; 
thc banks' cÖnsulting scrviccs did as weil. The annual rcport for 2006 from thc 
German Fcdcral Financial Supcrvisory Authority (Bundesanstalt fiir Finanzdiensl-
lt!islungsauj.vü:hl - BaFin) listcd alrnost 3,500 complaints rcgarding crcdit and 
tinancial institutions alonc . "~ Bctwccn 1992 and 1997, thirty-thrcc thousand com-
plaints wcrc madc to the Customcr Complaints Office (KundenbeschwerdesJelle) 
at thc Association of German Banks ( Bundesverbund deutscher 8Clnken). 10 
Whcn invcstigating the importancc of thc stock cxchange and stock scandals to 
thc national cconomy, the qucstion of who invcsts in thc stock markct must be 
answcrcd. Fcwcr than scvcn percent of Germans posscss stock. AJthough the num-
bcr of invcstors doublcd from 3.1 to 6.2 million betwccn 1988 and 2000, it tcll 
again aftcr thc crash in 2000 to 4.2 million.'' ln the United Statcs, on thc other 
hand. alrnost 50 pcrccnt of all houscholds havc thcir asscts in stocks. '! The Iosses 
from thc stock rnarkct also fcll noticcably hardcr in Gennany than in thc U .S. 1' 
Thus. it should not bc astounding that the Europcan sccuritics markct considcrcd 
altogcthcr is only half as !arge as ils Americao counterpart:~ 
Cf. Müllers . in :VIölkrs, Roller. AJ-hu,·-Puhli:ilt1T ( 2tJ03 ), ~ I margmal numbcr 2 ct s44.; ~lölkrs.. 
L..:t~ch. m KK-WpiiG. ~ 2007. §§ 3 7b, c marginal nutll~r 51 et sc:4. as weil as th~: further dctails in 
fwrnol..: I 0 . 
' S1..>t: Möllcrs.·Wci\:hcrt. NJW t2005). at fl 2737 . 
· B;~Fin. 'r'c:ur~r Rt'flort !006, (2007), at 4.1. p 203 . 
"' Sec Umbuclmlcmm·erjcJhrl!n Jer prinllf!ll /Junkt-n, as of 31.3.2007. touml unJcr h!tp ;,!www. 
bankcnvc:rhanJ.dc. These rcsulls arc confirmcd by thc invcstigation of third partics, Jike the non-prolit 
(jcnnan ~unsum~r organizatiun condu~ting indcpcndcnt tcsts ur thc cunsulting tinn Boo;: Allt:n Hum· 
t!ron. which rcspc~tivdy dcmonstratcd baLl consulting scl'\·iccs lor many acdit instituliuns tluring thc 
ycars :!UtJU.lH . ünly live houscs had a rating of .. faulty :· scc Finanztest (5i2000). flP 12, 15 : rinanztcst 
( Y!OO I l. 71) ct sqlj. ror :!006 sec thc study on c:onsulting 13oot Allen Hamilton. Tmdc Journal from 
6 . 14 .~007 . p 23 . 
" The numbcr or studhohJcr.; abovc: th...: agc of 14 ~rcW bctwccn 19M X and 2000 from 3,192.000 tu 
(,,.!li.OOtJ. only tu fall in 2006 tu 4.240.000. 13ccausc: ufthis only 6 .7 percc:nt ofthc Gcnnan Investor.; 
hold Jircct stocks aller a pcak in 2000 of 9. 7 pcrcc:nt. Sec! Deutsches Aktieninstitut (DA I). Fucrb.wlc . 
.!mJ7. H.3: Lcvcn. DA/-Kur;:sludil! (2,2006), p I, downl0 a«.Wblc undcr www .dai.de . 
•: b:unomtst from 26.5.2007. p X4 . S~ also Merkt, ()pinion U for thc 64, DJT. (2002). p I. Jl:!. 
' ' Thus thc DAX ti:ll from H.noo to 2.500 points. whilc thc Oow Jonc:s only fcll from 11,500 tu 
X.5tJO points. Sei! thc: graphic: from Möllers, in Möllcrl\/R~.tttcr, AJ-/uK-Publizitiit (2003}, ~ I maq~inal 
numbcr I ct SlJlJ. 
•• Final Rcport of thc Commiucc uf Wisc Mcn rcgarJin~ thc rcgulatiun of thc Europt!an S«uritics 
:\.brkct from 2.5.2001 (Lumfulu.rsy R~tport) p 16 availablc at http:llcurupa.c:u.intkomnllintcrnal_ 
markctisccuritics.'docsllamtalussy/wiscmcn/linal-ccport·Wisc-mcn_ Jc .pdf anJ thomas-mocllcrs.tki 
matcrialicn. 
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Conscqucntly, German citizcns will forgo lügher rctums which might hurt rct irc-
mcnt benetits. Thc abscncc of German willingncss to invcst in listcd compani~s 
also has an cconomical\y negative cffcct: thc smallcr start-up companics cspccially 
Iack vcnturc capital, which thcn hurts their international compctitivcncss. 1 ~ 
A common phrasc in Germany is ··moncy is as timid as a dccr." Investment cap-
ital is not subjcct to geographic rcstrictions and, bccausc of thc worldwidc int~gra ­
tion of data, can bc movcd at grcat spcc:ds with minimal \.:OSt. ... ßccausc invcstors 
can invcst in stocks from thc German Siemens AG just as casily as in thosc from 
the Finnish Nokia Oy or thc Amcrican Microsoft lnc., whcn in doubt he or shc will 
invcst in that vl!nture and in that markct, which offers thc bcst rate of n;turn and 
safcguards thc overall conditions thc bcsl. Empirical rescarch shows thar invcstor 
protcction regulations and thcir cnforccmcnt constitutc a fundamental rcquircmcnt 
of developed and liquid markcts. 17 ln addition, numcrous studics contirm thc asscss-
mcm that thc harmonization of the Europcan linancial markcts would ch:arly bring 
an increase in gains. 1ll ln this respcct, it is now up to thc Jcgislaturc to install thc 
corrcct framcwork so that capital docs not disappcar from thc domestic markct, 
thcrcby dircctly harming its own cconomy. Thc sccurity of thc sccuritics markct 
and thc cconomics thcrcin is a particularly signifkant subjc~..:t of protcction whi~h 
statcs must guard. 
Thc following will thcrcforc cxaminc whcthcr Europcan and German capiwl 
markct law alrcady contains laws and dutics ~nsuring that capital is invcstcd in thc 
German and Europcan markct and not in thc U.S. or othcr sccuritics markcts. Dur-
ing this analysis, attcntion will bc callcd to thc availability of mcasurcs for cnforc-
ing thcsc legal dutics, bccausc thc appropriatc infonnation and pmhibition duti~s 
an: only uscful whcn they do not stay .. law in thc books." rather arc obscrved by 
markct participants. ln ordcr to cnsurc this. thc classical sanctioning mcchanisms 
of civil, criminal and administrative law must bc comparcd and thc private go-..·er-
nancc dcbatc. i.c . law making through private mcasurcs. is to bc cxamincd. Empir-
ical considcrations and thc economic analysis of law will also bc indudcd in the 
argumcnt. Whcn talking about thc proper Ievel of rcsponsibility. thc catehworJ 
"ovcr-dctcrrencc" oftcn corncs up bringing up thc qucstion of thc ncccssary umount 
' ' Lamfalussy Rl!port (Fn. 14). p lb. 
•• Ckarly S\!~ll in ßl!nick.:. Wt'rlpt~pi~n·amiig,•n,· \'l'multu'lf.: ( 200f>), p lj I 
1
: Sec La Purta!Lupct.·dc-SilancSJShlcifcr!Vishny. 54 J.fin. I 1.' I l ttN7 ); '"''"'·'· 11)6 J.Pol. b:un. 
IIIJ. 11~0 ( 199H); itfems, 55 J.hn. I. 5 1!1 ~4 · (2000); Cuffcc. 25 J.Curp.L. I. 2 ( I'J'JIJ); Modigl~:lni . 
l'croni. J .. ,:! lnt.Rcv.rin . X I 1!1 ~4· (2000); ßlack. 4M UCLA L.Rcv. 7X I. 1<34 (.~00 I) . But sec Sicrn'. 
l fl lnt.CI.l.Commen.: .l.Rcv . .300 cl S'l4· (2005): Spamann. Harv .L. & Ecun. Oiscussion Pap. Nu 12. 
Juwnload;lblc umJcr http;.'!ssrn.corniab)trac t"- 1 095526 (4ucstioning th~! mcthool.llogy uscd by L.1 Pur1a 
ct al.). 
•• t\tt.achm~nt I ofth~! Urccn pap!!r on Financial Scr•u.:c: Pl.llicy (2.005 ·- 2.010} t'rom 5.3.2005. K0\1 
(2005). 177, attachmcnt I. pp -l: lamlalussy Rcport (Fn. 1~). pp 14 ct ~lj . : Eur0päischc Zcntralhanl... 7/r,· 
f:'uru l::.'qui~1 · .\lur/(1:/.~ (August 2001 ). lound undcr hllp :i.'w~w .ccb.int:'pubipdflolh..:r'cur\X:I.jUitymarkctcn . 
pJf. pp tu. 44 \!1 ~q . ; ßunc.J~svc:rbanLJ dcutS(hc:r Banken. Argmm:m.: :um 1-'imm:m,Jr/..t . .\lc.ir: (.!00-'1. 
louml undl!r hnp:;;www .bankc:nvcrband . ..kipidartikclpic,oJ2004!br1)403 ·-"""_.aLt' .. cuc.JI .c.Jt.pJf 
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of tinc tuning. Today somc smallcr companics prcfer to completcly withdraw from 
thc stock cxchangc bccause thc high costs are not proportionale to their carnings.'~ 
As a n.:sult, tinding thc balance bctwccn cconomic arguments and basic legal prin-
ciplcs will bc rcpcatcdly cxamincd. 
h. Economij.· Considerations in Securities Market Law 
1. The Relevance of Ec:onomic Arguments in Legal Application 
ln thc U.S., thc Law and Economics approach, i.c. an cconomic analysis of law, 
bccamc popular through thc Chicago school of economics20 and in particular 
through judgcs likc Lcamcd Hand~' and Posncr,22 who based thcir vcrdicts23 on 
cconomic factors. In Gcnnany, this approachwas shared by among othcrs, Schäferi 
Ott, Kirchner and Kirchgässncr. ~ 4 Howevcr, cconomic assessmcnt of efficicncy 
critcria contlicting with cthical valucs is often uscd as justification against thc 
cconomic analysis of lawY In addition, whcthcr cconomic arguments arc availablc 
for thc lcgislamn: only111 or whethcr thosc applying thc law and judges intcrprcting 
thc law also havc access2' is heavily debatcd. Only rcccntly, Wagner turncd against 
Eidcnmüllcr's thcsis lO leavc cconomic analysis open to thc lcgislature alonc. lt is. 
•· ln 2003. 6~ ~ornpanic~ ldt thc markct, in 2004 40 'ompanics ll!ft th~ markcl, sec Frankt!. Die 
ßc~nk ~tm5. Jssuo.: 2, at IM. 1-'or the withdr.1wal from thc market sc~ Schät~r. in Marsch·BamertSchäfcr. 
"'"''"'""" ·~ll.ist<·ci Compuni<·.r (::!005). H 61 ct s4q.; lfolzb\lm/Schlösscr, BKR (1002). 4!-16; Thciß. 
AG ! 0115. :11 215 and lil . 201). 
:·· Sec Eidcnmüllcr. t.'Jji=ic:n:. ul.~ Redll.fJmn:.ip I 3rd cd., .2005 ). pp 6 7 ct sc.jq. 
lnit.:J SI<Jtt•s ct al. v . Cumll {o\\'ing Co .. /nc. ct al.. 15~ ct sqq.2d 161) (2d. Crr. 11147). 
·· ln ac.Jdition, thc Judgcs Ea:;tcrbrook anti Brcycr arc vcry opcn to cconorni~ ~onsidcrauons. 
1 ' Lnih·J St<1fc:.r cl al. v. Cumll Tuwing Cu .. Im· . ct al.. 159 ct ~q .2d 169 (.2d. Cir. 1947); f..:nitt!d 
St.ttt'' FiJt•lity & Guurunry. C(). v. JuJrunslw S/,JhoJnll PlvviJhu. 683 d sqq.ld. 1022. 1029 (7th. Cir. 
llJX~) : scc also t>osncr. I J.Lcg.Stuc.J . 2~. 32 cl sqq. ( 1~72}: icl~m. Enmumh· Analy.\~f ofLaw. (5th. cd. 
I '!IJX l (Part I and II of thc 2nd cd .. tr • .mslatcd in: AssmanOJKirchncr/S~.:hanLc. Olcunomi.5dl.: Anu~\'.rt• 
,Je.' lh•dlf.f ( 191) 3 ). pp 79 ct sqq. 
:• Schäti:r:On, l.d1rbudr Jer iik.onomhe'ht!n Anulyst' des Li1•ilrt!dlf.~ (3rd ~d .. 2005). llowcvcr, sce 
!h~ opinion ur thc authors in thc following lootnutc. 
,., rczcr. JL (I~M6). at Ml7. X23 ; iclt·m. JL (19MH). at 223. 226 ct sqq.; Bydlinski. FunJumt!ntul~t 
J(,·,·hr.,xmmlfcit:t· 11 ~XX ). pp 2M5 ct sq4.; Kohl, in Ott!S~häf\!r, Ulcmwmisc:he Pruhlt!mt! Jtts Zi1•i/rc:dlfx 
1 I •JtJ II. pfl ~I. 50: ~löllcrs. Hedm·giitt'rschur:. im Umwelt- und Hujiungsrt!chr ( 1996), pp 123 et sqq.: 
hJo.:nmülh:r. l;'fli:~t·n:. .tls 1{,•,·/usprin:ip ( Jrd cd., 2005). pp 481 ~~ sqq. 
; .. R:usch. l'om .Vur:t•n Jer iiherlitll11111t!llt'll Atl.rlt!grmg.,·lcunont's für dil! prulctischt• Rl!dllsunw,·n · 
.Junx. (I 'IXH). pp 55. 57 0.:1 sqq.; Kohl. in Jahrhuch Junger lh·ilrecht.iwi.'isc!nsc:lwjier ( 1992). PP 21}, 4.5; 
JctailcJ 111 EiJcnmülh:r. f.'Qi:it!ll: 1.1/.r R,·,·ht.~pritdp (3rd cd., 2005). pp 426 Cl sqq ., 454 ct sq4 .• ~~b: 
also n:~cntly Wagner. Opmiun A jiJr th,_• 6/S. DJT (2006), pp 61 ct ~q . 
:· ln thc ~asc ot' sikncc from thc lcgi:~laturc argucd for by th~ supportcrs in thc U.S. as wdl as 
llurn , AcP /7() (I t,176 ), 307. 3211 cl sq4 .; SchäfcriOtt, Lehrhud1 Jer ülwnomisdtt!ll Anulysl! Je.,· Lil·il-
r,_•,·ht.\ (4th cJ .. 2005 ), pp I 6; Ott, in St:hä fer/011, Allulwtimm•.Ui:it!n: in Jer RttchrsorJnu11g ( II) lN l. 
pp 25. 31 d sqq.; Kötz, Ht!c:ht.slht!vrit! 30 ( 1991J), 130. 134 ct ~qq . : Küblcr, in FS Srt!inclorjf. ( 1990). 
pp M7, 6~0 ct sqq.: GrunJrnann. Huf>t!lsl61 ( 1997). 423.443 l!t ~q.: Wagner. in ,\fündrKomm tBGB. 
~1h ~u .. ~0041. V\lr ;i K23 marginal num~r 39 c!l s4q .. iJt!m, :kP 206 (2006). 352. 425 ct sq4. uppos-
ing lh~ authors namcd in rn . :!6. 
·-·-- ···- -- -- - -
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howcver, largely rccognized that thosc applying thc law may. for its intcrprctation 
only cmploy economic analysis \Vhcn thc lcgislaturc exprcssly acccpts cfticicncy 
as a goal of thc law. 211 Evcn thcn. \!conQmic considcrations may not bc uscd cxdu-
sivcly, but rather must bc opcn to othcr valuc considerations .N Thc following 
should show that capital market laYI in particular is a primc arca of law for thc 
considcration of economic factors bccausc thc lcgislaturc consistcntly acccpts cco-
nomic factors in its legislative pr\)posals and legislative intcnt. 
ii. FrmcliVIwbi/ity us an Ecvnol,,j(. GocJI uf Regulalion of the Europr:un Capital 
~"vlarkel Legislation. 
I. Allocation Efticiency 
Sincc thc crcation of sccuritics 111'lrj{ct Iaw on th~ Europcan l~vd. its Operability is 
incorporated into thc aim of cvcry sccuritics markct law ordi nanc~ . This is a prc-
rcquisite for thc market llcing ah1e to fult111 its cconomic fundion of cfficicntly 
allocating capitaJ.l0 Efticicnt allo~ation mcans that thc invcstmcnt capital goc~ to 
the areas wherc it is most urgcntly n~cdcd and can bc most promisingly cmploycd.H 
The economic background of th~ tlutY to disctosc is. in this rcspc.:ct, thc supposition 
of sccuritics markct cfficicncy. lhiS Supposition statcs that opcnly acccssiblc in-
formation is displaycd in thc mar)(~t prjcc immcdiatcly aftcr it bccomcs known to 
thc public. The duty to disclose o,, thc onc hand cnsurcs that thc appropriatc infor-
mation rcachcs thc markct and is ractorcd into thc pricc. '~ For ~xampk thc goal of 
ad hoc publication is to cnsurc "that thc rnarkc:t participants posscss markct relevant 
infonnation in time to makc thc upprQpriatc invcstmcnt dccision:-; ."" Information 
: .• Kin:hncriKoch, Anu(rstt und 1\riuk 11 ( I IJ~I} ), pp 111. 115 ; Kuh!. in J,,;,,hucJ, Jungt•r l.n·ilredll.\-
wi.~.~.:nschujic:r (I 'JIH ), pp 29, 45, Taupit,, .4d, jt;l5 ( 1 yY6}, I 14. I ;7. IJ f> : (irunJrnann. Hcthdsl f)/ 
( IIJ'J7). 423. 434 ct sqq.; tidcnmüllcr, t:0;;1i!ll: uf.,· R~::c/lf.Sprudp (3rd ~.:d .. :?005). pp -l5:? c l s~~ · 
'~ For thc r~..~uircd considcrations s~.--c th\! foiJowing fn . 165 ct S4'-t· and fn . I f>\J ct :.*l· 
'" 8q~r. Regt: 2. rrG. BT-Dru,k:. . l 2d,67~. p 4X: U~gr . hnanLausschuss ~ rFG. UT -Druds 
12t791M. ppiJ6. comparc also Baums. ~f{N 167 12(}()3 ). pp 139. ISO: Fu~o:hst [)Qhn . llKR (~00:? ). 
pp 1063. I 061J: Möllers. in ~1011crsiRotl~ r . Ad-Jwc:·Pup/i:it<IJ ( 200 3 ), ~ 3 maq~inal numba ~3: llopt 
Voigt. in lloptiVoigt. Prll.\pe!la- und l\ul,1rvlmcJrlainfvrmullunshujiung t2U06J. pp tl . IU7. lU : Vc il. 
LIIR 167 ( 2003 ). pp 3n5. 36 7: Zimmer. 111 ~..:hwark. KMHA; (3n.l c • .'d .. :!004 ). ~ 15 marg1na l oum~r :-~ 
Cl ~4 · 
' 1 Assmann. 1n Äl>smann, Schütze. f/o,1Jiu'd' ,ks kupirulcmlu!wredu.\ (lnJ ~o't.l .• I IJY7), ~ 1 marginal 
numbcr 24 Cl ~q .: KObkr. vc:.H•fl.'ichuf'·'• ·r,-/11 (5th c~ .. I'J9X). * 31.11. p 3'J() d sy4. as wdl as fn. I(> 
abovc. in adJition. üOC dJtTcrcntiatcs thc ,,~rational anJ in~titutionalctlkicm;y. ~cc: AssmJJlll. ah\)\1!. 
•: For infonnation d1i~ien~.:y in thc O.:illlii;JI Illarkct auJ l:.}!idc:m Cup1tcd AhHkC!t 11.1f1•1tl~c·.\'i.~ rf:C.\IHJ 
sec for instan~.:c Fama. 25 J.rin . 3~3. 3~<·• cl SI.{~. ( 1~701: itlc:m. 4n J.Fin . 1575. 1576 ( II)(} I); rls..:hd. 
74 Com . L.~r:v.IJ07tl1JlN) ; Urar:kyJMycrs. f'ri,,, .,jJft·.~ "{CIJrpurutt' Fincllll'l' (7th cJ. 2003). pp 347 <:1 
S~4·; Elton/GrubcriHrowniGuclnnann, ,\/, ,,ft·ffl Port/cJ//(J rhl'IJf.\' 111/d Im •.. ,·rm,·ol( (llh cd. 2111'-' ). PP 40~ 
1.:1 Sl.\4· 
" 13\!gr. Rt:g.E 4 . FHi, BT-Dru~:k~ ~~·~ot7. PI' ~7 ri.H * 15 Wpllv : U..:gr. Rq:l: AnSVli. 
l3T-Oruds. 15i J 174. p 34 right ..:olumn. 
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also scrvcs in thc cqual trcatmcnt of markct participants. H Insider trading laws, on 
thc othcr hand, aim to frustrate thc crcation of unrcasonablc markct prices, which 
havc ariscn from insufficicnt information. 
2. Thc Protcction of Investor Confidcncc 
Allo~ation cfticicncy is rcgularly associated with individual invcstor protectionY 
Thc goal is that thc confidcncc of thc invcstor in thc financial markct is assurcd. 311 
Thc Europcan Court o f Justicc rccognizcd this goal as a justification for rcstricting 
thc frccdom to providc scrviccs. 31 Listcd companics arc information monopolists311 
for mattcrs conccrning company statcmcnts: the invcsting public and financial 
analysts can only inspcct this data on a rcstrictcd basis. Likcwisc, thc scrvices of 
invcstmcnt tirms in thc securitics ficld as wcll as tinancial analysts respcctivcly is 
inhcrcntly a commodity rcquiring a high amount of trust, which thc customcr can-
not control or can control but only with high costs. 3~ Because listcd tinns and fi-
nancial intcrmcdiarics havc acccss to knowledge that is verifiable by the investor 
only on a rcstrictcd basis, thc so-callcd principal-agent problern ariscs. Churning 
anti contlicts of intcrcst arc only two of thc obvious dangers in thc process.~ As 
has bccn sccn bcforc, manipulation of thc markct and infonnation asymmetry also 
Iead to a loss of trust, causing thc invcstor to withdraw from the stock markct.4 1 
' ' ln gcm.:ml Fkischcr, Opinio11 ,..jiJr tht• M . DJT. (2002). pp I. 27ct s~~· For thc right to Iake ovcr 
..;..:..: ~ 3 :\b~ . I WpÜG: for customcrs of ~curiucs cxchangc provid-:rs sec also Koller. in AssmamvSch· 
nc•Jer. Wpl/(; ( ~th .:d .. 2006). ** 31 marginal numbcr 53. 
•· 'I h.: grouru..l for considcration I 10 thc In vestment Scrvu:cs in thc Sc:curitics F u:ld tJ J:22· EEC from 
5.10.1 ti'JJ , OJ ~r . L 141 . 27: .. ( ... )m orJcr to proteer invcstors anJ thc stabrlity of thc tinan..:ral sy->· 
tcm."' F lci~..:hcr . ibid, pp I. 15 ct S<t~.: further prooffrum Möllers. in Möllcrs/Rottcr. AJ-Iwc: -Publi:itcit 
(21JtH). ~] margtnal numlx:r 24 ct S<l~ · 
'• Rc..:ital I of thc Din:ctivc on publ ication of intonnation whcn a major holding 10 a listc:J com-
pany is acquirell or Jisposcd of HMt617/EEC from 12. 12 .19H8. OJ Nr. L 24M. 62 and Rcctial 1-4 lnsidcr-
LJirc..:uvc MIJ;51.}:!; EEC from II.IJ . I9H9, OJ !'Ir. L 33-1. 30 
•· Europcan Court of Ju.sticc from 5. 10.1995. Casc C-.\H4:93. ECR 1995. 1- 11 67 paragraph 42. 
( NJ W IIJ95 ). 2H I - Alpint! lnwstml!nWJ/ini.ftt:r nm Finunciifn spc=aking of thc ··Reputation of llo l-
lanJ's Financial Marke!." 
'' Compan: Möllcrs!LI!i~h . W~ (200 1). pp 1648. 1654. 
•• ror rhc drviston in tu thn:c parts of Sud1giitt!r (s.:arch goods). /:.'rji.Jhrungi·J!.ütc:r l cxpcrkncc gooJs) 
:1nc.i ~ ·,·rtrauc:m•giitc:r (t:redcncc goods) sei! Nelson. 7K Poi.Eco. 729 ( lli74): sce also van der Bcrglu· 
Lc.:hmann. GRUR ln l. ( 1992). pp 5M8, 591. 
"' :\kcrluf, X4 Q.J.b .:on. 4MH. 4tJ3. 495 ( 1970); Spcnt:c, R7 Q.J.Econ. 651.659 ( 1973): Hupt. Oc:r 
Ko~pitulanh•g,·r.l·dmt; im Rc:cht dt•r Bcmli~tll ( 1975). pp IOX cl sqq .. Bcnickc:. Wt!rtpupi~rwrmÜJ.:l!!Un~r­
a·cdtunJ.! ( 21106 ). p 151}. 
" llupl . AG ( 1995), pp 353. 357; Posner. l:.'c:onomic Anulysis of Luw (7th c.:d. 2007), ~ l·U 2. pp +t9 
.:t "4~ . : E~ll:rbruok.lrischcl . Tlttt /:.'nmomit· Struc:turt! uf Corpurute Lc1w ( 1991 ). pp 253 Cl S<t4·: Grund-
mann. Hc1hdx/. 61 ( I tJ97). pp ~25, 436: Lahmann. !tuiJt!rhumit:l - Olconumischl! . .fnuly.l~ einl!s vrJ-
•IIIIIJ.I."fwli tigfl,•n Dilt:mmw; (I ')94 ). pp 31 ct sq~ .• 160 ct s44.; 1-"leischcr. /nji.Jrmu ticmsusymmt!lrltt im 
l ',•rtrax.\·rc:du (1001 ). pp I MM d ~Cot·; ScMt~r!Ott, Lehrhud1 cll!r ülcunomischl!ll Anu~\·sc: Jl!s livilr~dus 
Hth cJ .. ~U05). pp oS9 c l s44.; t-'ki~hcr.lGR (2004). pp I. 30; llirte, in KK-WpJIG (2007), Einl. Mar· 
ginal numbcr 26 ct S<tc.I· I lA Manne. lnsitlcr Trmling und thc: Stock M arlt.l!t ( 1966). chup. Clll · X. s . . B 
15K; Kn:ss. f."jfi:tm:onctnlit•rte 1\·upitulmctrlt.trc:xuliaull~ ( 1996 ). pp 16 1 ct sq~ . 
----·---··-- - --- ----------------
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Prcciscly such a withdrawal is associatcd with thc prcviously-mcntioncd cconomk 
costs. likc vcrifiably lowcr funds for private pcnsion plans and a Iack of vcnturc 
capital attcr thc stock market crash in 2000.~2 As a rcsult it must bc cnsurcd that 
the appropriatc rcporting rcquircments guarantce thc public confidcncc in thc mar-
ket."3 
These thoughts illustrate that thc considcration of cconomic factors are inhcrent 
in thc Gcnnan Securities Trading Act (Werlpapierhandelsgesetz- WpHG).""' Thc 
Transparcncy Directivc, which recently has becn implcmcntcd into thc WpHG.-~~ 
has ncwly rccmphasizcd thc intcrplay of thcsc different goals with partkular clar-
ity in rccital 8: "Efficicnt, transparent and intcgratcd sccuritics markcts contribute 
to a genuine single markct in thc Community and fostcr growth and job crcation 
by bctter allocation of capital and by rcducing costs. Thc disclosurc of accuratc. 
comprchcnsive and timcly information about sccurity issucrs builds sustaincd invcs-
tor confidcncc and allows an infonncd asscssmcnt of thcir busincss pcrfonnancc 
and asscts. This cnhance~ both invcstor protcction and markct cfticicncy." Jt> 
111. The Aims of the Law and Ec:onumic Approach 
Whilc jurisprudcncc cnquircs as to thc lcgality of an action. cconomics is conccmcd 
with its costs and utility."'; lt is assumcd that individuals' dccisions arc fundamcn-
tally madc on a rational basis according to cost and utility aspccts with thc goal ot' 
sclf maximization in mind (homo oe,·onomic:u:>').-'K According to thc Kaldor-Hick~ 
Tl11.:on.:m. a rcgulation is dcsirablc whcn thc gains of thosc that arc bcttcr IJ!f cx~ccd 
•: Sc.: aho"c fn . 15 anu Lt:nt!nba~h. Kaprlulmc1rla- und /Jiir_,·,·nrec/11 (2002). \targ111al numbcr ~ . -1_ 
Hcis~hcr, Opinion F(or tht' fJ.I. DJJ" (2002). pp I. I 00: Duhn. ScJwJ,·m,·r.~·at::h<~/;ung luir.,,·nntJiu·n,·r 
.4Jaienxttst!IJ.~ch<Jjil'11 jiir ji:hl.:rlwjic: Ättpitulmur~tinjurmutum ( 2003 ). pp 2 54. 
• l Comparc Rc~ital 2 of the Dircctivc 2003;6, EEC from I .2X.20()J msiJ~r dcaling and m;.~rkct manip-
ulation ( Markct Abusc Dirccti ... ·e). OJ Nr. L lJ6. pp 16. For tho.: Gcm1an law_ sec for instan~c fur thc antru-
duction to thc WpltG p 2 rFG. ~cgr. RegE. BT-Druds. I2!6671J. pp 33 (tran:-.IJt.:u): .. ln :~dJ11ion. th~ 
law as trying to raisc: invc::stor contidencc through prc:cisc: tmprovc:mcnts in th-: an:a of in\'c~tor prot~c ­
tion. Thc: ability tu cquitably and qukkly acccss pub lil.: in tom1ation rcgard ing thc objc~ts tradcd in th.: 
s.:curitics market wcrc improvcd and thc covcruge of intonnation tu bc publishcLI c:\p;.~nlkd . Thc:.c Jrc 
~rucial prcretjuisites for an equitablc and ~tli.:icnt markct result": similar tl• 3. FGG. lkgr . Ro.:gE. 13T-
Dru~ks. 131!!922. pp 55:-'· FGG. ~cgr. RegE. BT-Dru~ks . I·MWI7. pp 62: for an"'~" t~w sec ~tölkrs. 
10 Mölkr.JRottc:r. A.d-lwc-Puhli:iliit (2003). § 3 marginal numbcr 24 c1 sq4. 
u Acwrdingly for insiJcr law; sc~ fn. 41. 
" hnplcmcntcd through thc Tr.tnsparcncy Oirc~ti,·e tmplcmcmation A~t from 1.5.20117. H(j BI. 1 
p I 0; RegE, BR-Drucks. 579!06. ~T -Drucks. 16/249K. UT -Drucks. 16/"2~ 17: UT -Dru..:ks. \6 .']64-1: 
printc::d in KK-WpHG. Addendum 112 . 
... See: Rl-"1:ital I in Oircctivc 2004/IOWEC for thc h:mnon iLation uf thc tran:-.par.:ncy ~tanJarJ, 111 
n:l:uionship to infonnation about issucrs whosc sccuritics ;.~ rc admtth:d trJJ~ 1n a r~gubt~d m:~rko.:t JnJ 
for thc changc in Oircctivc 2001!}4/ EC from 12. 15 .:!005. OJ Nr. L J9U. p 3~ tTranspan:ncy Otrcc-
tivc::) . ltali~~ addcd. 
•: SchmiJtchcn. in SchmidtchenJWcth. Da t.Jji:it·n: uuf d~·r ~iwr (I •)')9). pp 9. 14 
•• ln Anglo-Amcrican law. this pre~umption is saiu to bc th.: Kt:::l'.tl\.1-hyputh~:.•s ~n·.\·our, ·.-­
/uf. t.:l·aluuling. m,Lrimi:inx mun). Gritlith,Goldfarb. in Kolurdl:\lllkr. So. ·ral Norm., cmd f:"nmo1mc 
/Jl~llflllirms (I <NI). pp )9. 44 ct ~'1 - : Kin:hncr. c)l;.,m,Jmisc/1,. T"httorr.· Jl·s Ht.:,·lu.,- ( I'N7J. pp II ~~ Sll'-l · 
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the Iosses of thosc that arc worsc off and thosc that arc worse otT can bc made 
wholc through thosc that are bettcr off. 4~ According to the Coase Theorem, exter~ 
nalitics through private transactions will always end up wherc thcy can most 
cffcctivcly be cmploycd. so Out of thesc theories, thc conclusion was rcached 
amongst othcr things that transaction costs must be minimizcd51 and legal right to 
action must bc givcn to those pcrsons in whose hands they will be most efficicnt-
ly uscd.s~ A~ an outcomc of this, in liability law thosc partics in thc position to 
prcvent thc darnage at the lowest cost (ehcapcst eost avoider), should carry the cost 
of thc damagc. 53 Listed companics have a greatcr advantagc in rcgards to thcir 
intcrnal information.H Thcy can rclativcly casily provide investors with the ncces-
sary information, in ordcr to equalize the investor's infonnation deficit; it is in this 
facct thc chcapcst cost avoidcr.ss From this point of view, the corresponding pub-
lication rcquircmcnts arc justificd. ~6 
Economic analysis of law rescarchcs thc conscqucnces of regulations in tenns 
of an cvaluation of the conscqucnccs and the legal objcctivcsY In trying to ana-
lyzc its worth, cconomic analysis of law asks whcthcr thc rcgulations arc cfticicnt 
and further thc wcllbcing of the collcctivc (allocation cfticicncy}.511 Forthis reason, 
law should also act to control bchavior. cspccially sctting preventativc inccntivcs 
to avoid unlawful bchavior. This is true tirst and forcmost in liability law. 5~ 
Kin:hgässncr. JL ( I Y91). pp l 04, I 06; Sch!ili:r!Ott. Lt!hrbuch der ülcunmntscllt!n An11lpt! J~:f Li\'1/rt•<.'hts 
( ·hh cd .. 20051. p 5X. 
~'~ :"Jamcd aller thc cconomiSl$ Nockolas Kaldor and Sir John Hicks. sec Kaldor. 49 b:on .J 54Y 
( I •J JY J. llicks. 49 Econ.J. 696 (I '})9); Mansfidd • . \fluoenmomü.:s {6th ed. 19lU~). pp 490 d s~q . 
... c..-.,asc . . \ J.L. & b:on. I. h .:t :.qq. ( I 960 ); translar..:J in Assmann/Kin:hncr'Schanzc. Ükmumll· 
,,.,,. . . -lna~l'.\t' Je:.,· H~·du I IY'JJ). pp 129 ..:t sy4. 
'' Coa~c. 3 J.L. & Econ. I. 27 ( 1960); Drcxl. /Ji~: wirt.fdrujilü:ht! St!lbsthe:~timmung J .. s l'ttrbrau· 
, h,·rs. ( I 99XJ. flf'l 19X. lkgan..l ing thc itka sec Eidcnmülkr. l:.ffi:tt•n: als Rt!dltsprin:ip (Jrd cd .. 2005). 
pp '17 ct S44· 
•: Cuasc. up eil. pp 19 cl S4'!· I I '160). translatcd in Assmann/Kin:hncr• Schan1c. Ökutrrmrischt! Ana· 
/.I .H' eh· ... Rt•dus. op <:it. pp 121J. 16'J: Cooler. ll J .Lc~.Stud . 225 (19M2). 
" Calabrcsi, Tht! Cost ofAn·iJenl.\' . . ~ Lcgul u11d J::cvnomh: Anulysis (Jrd cd. I IJ72). pp 135 ct S4lJ·: 
( 'oasc. up <:II. p n Cl S44· (I'}()()); translatc:d in Assmann/Kir<:hncr/Schanzc:. Ölwnumi.ICirf! Anclf.~·.'ie Jcs 
Ul·chts. op eit. pp 12lJ. 146 ct sqq.; Saljc. Rec:htstlr~torit!, p 15 ( 19K4). pp 277. 2H5; Wehrt. Kritisdtes 
n.·rlt•/jolrre.udrriji Jiir Gt!.l't!t:gt:hrmg llllci Recht.nd.üt!IISChu.fi ( 1992). PP 35M. 363 I! I sqq.: Schäfer;On. 
Lcltrlmc·h Jc:r iilconomi.n·hen Anul,rst! clf!.'i Li1·ilr1!dlls (4th cd .. 2005). p 226 
' ' For morc on the iJc:a of an infonnation monopolist, sec abovl! fn . 3H. 
" Zcll:s<:hc, AJ.tirmiir.~in/iJrnwtiml in dcr htlr.tt.•tmuth:rten Alctit!IIXI!.SeJI:H'hcJji (2006). pp 37; KönJ-
g~n. in : 1-'S On1cy (1002). pp 71J I . 7')6 t3lks about the drt:upt:st injormarion prm·iJt•r . 
..., Fm this sec cxh:nsivcly FlciSI:hcr. lnfurmutiun.susymmetric im Vatrugucdll (200 I). pp 149. 435. 
~ox. 
•: Posncr, i:.'t·mwmic Anuf.r.ris vfLwr. op dt. pp 24 ct sqq. 
•• t::astcrbruok/fischd, The ~;,·,.u,wmic: Stru,·ture ofCorportJtc Luw. op ~it, pp K ct syq .. Pl)sn..:r. EnJ-
mmltc Ana~n·i.\· rif LeiK', op eit, § 2.2. pp 25; SchJf..:r10U, Ltthrbuch Ja cJicrmvmisdten Ana(rst! JL's Li\·il-
rt·dus. up cit. pp 16: Kir\:hner. Ölwnomist·he Thevrif! Jt!s Rechts. op ..:it. pp 8 .:t sqq .• 12. 
\~ Calabn .. -si. 7H llarv.L.Rcv. 713. 715 ct 544· (I ~65 ); S~häfcr/Ott. Lt:hrbut·h Jer ,1/wnumi.~dtttll .·llwl· 
.1:\t· cl~·s Livilrf!dlls. op ..:it, pp 125 et sqq.; Brüggcmc:icr, Prinzipittn df!s Hujiung.vttt·hts ( liJ'N). pp .3 
ct sqq. ror lhc \jUI!Stion of whcthc:r gcncr.tl civil law is also allowcd to control personal ~havior. sec 
Wagner . . kP ~06 (2006). pp 352. 364 ct sqq. anti thc: tollowin~ tn. 14-t. 
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II. Economic Considerations for Law-Making and Legal Enforcement in 
the Capital Market through the Government and through Private 
Methods (Private Governance) 
a. lnadequute Supervi~ion tlzruugh the Stock Murker 
Bcing ablc to autonomously makc laws can bc an cffcctivc mcans of control for 
the stock exchangcf.o, especially when sctting thc price of a ncgotiable instrumcnt. 
Howcvcr whcn it comcs to thc implcmcntation of morc extensive dutics of disclo-
surc or dcsistancc, obscrvation by thc exchangc can only bc scen as conditionally 
appropriatc, as is madc clear by three cxamplcs. In thc coursc of sclf-rcgulation, 
"Suggestions for Solving thc so-callcd Insider Problem" werc passed in 1970. 
which rcmaincd valid in a modificd vcrsion from 198861 until the cnaetmcnt of the 
sccond Act for thc Promotion of thc Financial Markct (Finull=marktji1rclerwJ>;sge-
serzes - FGG) in 1993. '"(hcsc wcrc ncithcr legal rcgulations nor customs. rather 
applicd only through contractually bascd rccognition by thc partics. ßccausc they 
wcrc rarcly used, thcy wcre criticizcd at oncc as bcing incffcctivc.t·: 
The Europcan rcquircmcnts for thc ad hoc publication duty wen: implcm~.:ntcd 
in 1987. At that time, a violation was, bcing a misdcmeanor for the \.vrongdoer. 
only fined monctarily up to 100,000 DM (§ 90 par. I numbcr 2. 4 ßörsengcsctz ·· 
BörsG). Thc cxchangc dircctors, who wcrc to ovcrsee thc ad hoc publication accurd-
ing to § 44a par. I s. 2 BörsG. typically rcmaincd idlcY Bctwccn 19H6 und I tJ93. 
only six ad hoc noticcs wcrc publishcd~ resulting in the rcgulation rccciving liulc 
mcaning in practicc. In rctrospcct, it should bc rcsigned to pure law in thc books:·! 
After thc ad hoc publication duty wns introduccd into thc WpllG and ovcrsccn by 
thc govcmmcnt, thc numbcr of ad hoc notitications incrcasl.!d dramatically: since 
that time bctwccn 1,000 and 5,000 ad hoc notitications havc bccn r..:cordcd annu-
ally.tot. 
Similarly negative was thc cxpaicncc in thc ncw markct in thc ycars 1999 -
200 I. Only bodics of rulcs and regulations undcr private law compdkd ad hoc 
... KUmpel. Blink- und Kupitalmurktr.-.. :ht 1 3n.J ..:d .. 2004 ). :'-.I argmal numh~r I 7 . 3~6 . 
, , J\rising rrum Insider traomg Oircd iVCS. trading and ~unsulting Laws anu thc \.:O OSII IUIIOII.tl I)Hkr 
m th..: issuc from Junc 19!1~ . UAnz. 19MX. p 2l<33: for th1s abo Baumba\.:hillopt. 1/<ilJ (29th ~J .. I 995 ). 
I 161 with cxplanations. 
•! Assmann, ,-t(j ( 1994). pp 196. 19M: tll.· lam.·. 10 Assmam1.- Sdln1!1,kr. lrpJ/0, op ~ 1 1. \.'u r ~ 12 
Margtnal numbcr 5 ct Sc.N . 
~ · Pdlcns. AG I 1991 J, pp 62. 63 . 
... S~hwarlc, in BLictxc. ln.rtdt!rudlf und Ad-hcll·-Puhh:itcl t t 1995 ). pp 'J7. liY: Witll~h . .-1 G 1 I 'JlJ7). 
I. :!: llapp, J'L ( 1994 ). pp ::!40, 241. 
M llopr, liiR /5Y ( 11:N5 ). pp 135. 147: Ekkcnga. L0R (ll.N'J). pp 165. I llll: lichrt. n,e "''"•' .ld-
lzrK·Puhlbtüt nc.Kh .:i 15 Wcrtpopit·rhtJ11dd.~;:t'sct: (I 'N7). r 27 . F0r skcpttdsm on thts issuc. :.<.:c also 
Schwark, 8r1r:o>G (::!nJ ..:d .• 1994). ~-Ha HörsG marginal numb..:r I. 
... Sec th..: cvidcncc pn:scnh:d in Mölkrs. in Mölkrs/Rottcr . . .f.J.Jtoc.·-Puhlt:tl•"il . up cit. ~ 3 margmal 
numtxr 9 1!1 sqq. Schäfer. in Mar~ch-Bamcf/S~häf\:r, HanJhudt cl.·r hcirs.·mlutit·rr.·n .-f{j ( ~005). * 14 
marginal numlxr 4. 
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publication or 4uartcrly rcports, somewhat like the hithcrto cxisting borlies of rulcs 
and rcgulations in thc new markct.67 The stock ex.changc admitted too many com-
panics lacking markct rcadincss: of thc 350 ncw markct companics. seven wcrc 
takcn out of thc markct in thc first half of 200 l. thcrc werc nine insolvencics, and 
32 wcrc tradcd with priccs undcr onc EUR.611 ln addition, thc exchange did not 
cffcc.:tivcly p.rocccd with grievanccs.69 lt was also hcavily debatcd to which extcnt 
th~.: cx.changc could unilatcrally changc ils bodics of rulcs and rcgulations.70 Thc 
loss in rcputation was so largc that in the end thc new market as a market segment 
was cntircly phased out. 71 
Economically thc stock exchangc was not in the position pcrsonncl- or busincss-
wisc for cffcctivc supcrvision. A private rcgulatory authority can command ncither 
compulsory scarchcs nor subpocna witncsses under threat of sanction.12 In addi-
tion. thc cxchangc was lacking sanction rcmedics neccssary tobe able to proceed 
against violations of the bodics of rules and regulations.1l Whilc thc contractual 
thrcat of cxclusion as such ccrtainly constitutcs a powerful sanction. it cannot be 
rulcd out that thc vigoraus compctition bctwccn thc ex.changcs inhibitcd strictcr 
control bccause of the danger of othcrwise losing customcrs.H For this rcason, it 
was logical that thc voluntary sclf-monitoring of thc Insider Directivcs would bc 
\.!L}Ually formalizcd as was rcccntly thc duty to publish quartcrly figurcs. 7~ 
h. Supen·ision thrvugh Stute-run Supervisvry Autlwrities 
i . J::urvpecm- wide lnrrvductivn uf Supervisury Aurhurities 
A ln.:auy by the end of the 1980s. thc Europcan lcgislaturc had cnactcd rcgulations. 
panly as a rcsult of thc abscncc of dJcctivc supcrvision, for thc purposc of implc-
'·· So:..: . ~ par 7.1 UuJy uf ruks tor th..: Ncw Markct from 3 . 10 . 1~97. print~J in W.\//YY7. auss-
tille .\. pp II ..:1 s~N - · Frankfurter Wcrtpapicrbör.;c, Lo.H:hl . .\'r. Y: llanft:Kr..:tschm..:r. AG (2001 ). pp M4 
ct "Y4· 
•• Cbusscn. 88 ( 2002). pp I 05. 106 proviJing furthc:r sour..:cs. 
"' Chara..:t..:ristically th..: ..:umpanics sw.:c:..::osfully sued wen: listcd on th..: :'-lc:w :-.tarkct. SC\: th..: ful-
lowlllg fn . 135. 
··• LG 1-"mnkfurt from X.l6.2001. W~1 (2001 ). at 1607: LG Wup~nal from 11.2~ .2001. BKR (:.!002). 
at I'} I: OL(j 1-"rankfurt from 4.23.200:!. UKR (2002!. at 459: S..:hwark. in Schwark. KMRK (3rd cd .. 
21l04 1. ~ 49 13örsG marginal numbcr 4 . 
. , for this. 13:1rcn. mm Aus.-.terhl•n hedroht. in Pcr_/iJrm~omn• - dcH KundcnmugLJ;:in da Bcrlina 
t:JJ,·kt,·nh,mJ.. (July 2003). http;IJwww.c!l"fcktcnbank.c.JdperfiPERF_ 0703.pdf. p 3: Ot!utsche Uör.;..: st..:llt 
N..:ucn Markt c:in unJ tt!ilt Gesamtmarkt in ;;w..:i Segmente. Biir.ven;:citung onlinc St:ril!s (27.9.2002). at 
http:;.'WW\Io . bo..:rscn-.t.citun~ . ..:omtunlinl!/r..:daktiontaktu..:ll!vollanskht - st.php'.'artlkt!ll o~ 155 _55 _I Oll -
135 _7~_156_~40_1~7_. 
•; Oamr.JU. Sdh.o;lrttgulit~rung im Kapitalmur~tr~tcht (2003 ). p 1(2. 
' ' Along thosc! Jin~.-~ Rudolphi Röhrl. in llopt!Rudolph!Baum. Bür.\e:,m:Jurm ( 1997), pp 143. I X9 tor 
lhl! punishm..:nt of insidcr trading. 
·• bplicitly adJrcs~c.J by Rudolph!Rilhrl. in HopuRudolphiHaum. Bürsl!nrcji~rm. op cit, pp 143. 
217 : "'Thc o;u~rvisors fonn a siknt cartd with th..: supt:rvtS\:d." 
·• Through lhc TUG ( fn . 45). As a rc:sull. this kads ro a win of thc: WpltG and an according luss 
1.11' thc Uör~(j . 
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mcnting supcrvisory authoritics in cvcry Mcmbcr Statc. lmportant arcas of capital 
markct law wcrc put under contro] of a national supcrvisory authority. 71' With thc 
implcmcntation of thc Insider Dircctive, thc German lcgislaturc had thc goal of 
creating an attractivc tinancial centcr - intcmationally comparcd - with govcm-
mcntal Supervision of thc markct and an cffective prohibition of insidcr trading.i~ 
The implcmcntation in thc German lcgislaturc camc about through thc sccond Fi-
nanzmarkt.fordenmgsgeselz (Financial Markct Advanccmcnt Act) with thc crcation 
of thc WpHG. 7~ Through thc implcmcntation of an insidcr trading prohibition. thc 
improvcmcnt of markct transparcncy and thc crcation of a ccntral and comprchcn-
sivc markct supcrvisor as weil, thc aim was to achicvc cftcctivc invcstor protcction 
and strengthen thc invcstor contidcncc, which is indispcnsiblc for a functioning 
capital market.111 This cstablishcd capital markct law as an indcpcndcnt ficld of law 
in Gcrmany.110 Shortly afterwards, thc Bafin was established, a combination of the 
Fcdcral Sccuritics Supcrvisory Office (Bundesaujsichtamt jiir Wertpap;erlwndel). 
the Fedcral Banking Supervisory Office (Bundesauß·ichtsaml }iir Kredilwesen) and 
the Fcdcral lnsurancc Ad,;isory Office (Bundesaujsic:htsaml ßir clcJs Versidzerungs-
wesen)."' Similar comprchcnsive financial supervisory authoritics cxist in Denmark 
with thc Finanstilsynet, in Austria wilh thc Financial Markct SupcrviSOI)' Author-
ity (Finan~marktaujsic.:htshehörde), in Grcat Britian with thc Financial Service Au-
thority (FSA) and in Francc with thc Autorite de.'i ,\fardu!.'i Finam:iers (AMF):': 
Through thc Lamfalussy Proccss, lcgislating at thc Europcan Ievel rcachcd cvcn 
strongcr intcnsity in thc dircction of full harmonization ."' 1 
· .. Th.: tirst rclJuircmcnts for -.:rcatJon of such an authority wen: founJ tll :\rt. I~ uf thc Dirct.:tl\.: 
r.:g:.~rJing .. inf~.>mwtion tl.> bc publisheJ whcn a majur holding tn a listctl-.:~.>mpany ts a-.:-tuir.:J or Ji~poscd 
of' (fn. 36). Art. lS Insider Dirc~:tivc 89i592t EEC (fn. 36) unJ Art . 22 Investment Scr.·i-.:cs U1rccttv.: (fn. 
3)). ln th.: m.:antimc. cvcry Dircctivc d.:signatcs uvcrstght thruugh a .:ompctcnt authoril}. likc ar1 . 4:-i 
1!1 s4q. Uin:ctiv~: 200-ltJl)/EC frorn 4.21.2004 rcgan.ling thc markct f~.>r linan~o: tal llhtrumcnts ( :'\liFiDl. 
OJ Nr. L l-t5. I. chang<J through the Approximation Dm:ctivc 200{,:3 I 1EC frorn 4.5.2006. OJ Sr. l 
114, o), art. :! I ct sqq. Dircctivc ::!OU)t71 ! EC frum 11.4.2003 n:gard111g th..: pro~pc-.:lus..:s. whi..:h ;.~r..: tu 
bc publishcd whcn ~curiti..:s arc: publically otl<:red or admitted intu trJdc. and also tur thc changc uf 
Dir.:ctivc 200113411:( (Prospcctus Dirc~o:tivc). OJ Nr. L H5. M. art. 1:! d S44· \l:..trk..:t Abusc Dir..:\."ttvc 
tfn. 43) ur art. 24 cl S44· ~.>f thc Tmnsparcncy Oircc:ti\.: {fn. -t6). 
· ~ Assmann, A(j (I 'i'J4 ), pp I ~6. 199: Bundcsminrstl!f der f inanz.:n, h.t~n:c!Jif Fmcm:plat: Dwt.'< IJ. 
la11d. WM I 1992), pp 420, 422; Kum~l. WJ/ ( 1992). pp 3XI. 385. 
:. Thc s~.·wnd Ad for thc Promotion of thc Financial ~t:~rk.:t frum 7.2b.l 994, 13ül31. I. pp 17-t9 
..., 2. t-'FG. lkgr. RegE, BT-DnKks. 12i6679. p 35 as wdl as finan.laussc:hu:-.~. IH-Orucks. 12;7YIX. 
p '>5. 
"" llopt, I.HR 15V ( 1995), pp 135, lb3. 
' 1 Ac! Rcgartlmg thc lntcgratcd Financial Services Sup.:rvi~or (rinOAU) frum 4.::!2 .2002. B(jtll. I 
( 2004 ). at :!630. 
•: s~.~ Gies~rts, in A"J\ -IfpHv (2007). § 4 margmal numbcr I 3. 
•• h>r 1hc Lamfalussy Pr01:css s~-..: fn. 14. 
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ii. Ecunumic Cunsiderutiuns ji1r Stute-run Supervision 
ln principlc, thc statc should only intervcne in the market when the market breaks 
down. 114 An argument in favor oflegislation through private mcasures isthat private 
kgislators oftcn know thc rnarket bctter and have significant advantagcs in infonna-
tion gathcring. This might render thcir decisions more credible for the rcgulatcd 
community.: Private organizations are, morcover, flexible in undertaking the ap-
propriatc adjustmcnts. 11~ In addition, with administrative law supcrvision, the trans-
action cost incrcascs accordingly; the BaFin 's budget currcntly amounts to 126 
million EUR, which is significant."~> To avoid cost for thc public hand thc Bafin is 
primarily tinanccd from finns providing invcstmcnt scrvices in the sccuritics ficld 
and only to a small perccnt from fccs.x7 Thc finns thcn placc thcsc costs on thc 
invcstor with thc rcsult bcing that, in thc end, the transaction costs for buying or 
sdling sccuritics increase. In thc case of state-run supervision, fccs to enlist in-
crcasc for thc companics subjcct to supcrvision as weil which would restriet com-
pctition . '~~< 
Four argumcnts can, howcvcr, bc uscd in favor of statc-run supcrvision: Private 
law-making is often not in a position to bc thc appropriate supervisor, as thc Iack 
of cnforccmcnt of the stock cxchangc rcgulations has shown. Conflicts of intercst 
arisc quitc often. likc thc principlc-agcnt situation bctwccn thc customer and thc 
finns providing invcstmcnt serviccs in thc securitics ficld. 11'~ for instancc if avail-
ablc insidcr inforrnation is cxploited on account of a third party. Since an incen-
tivc cxists tor misconduct, confidcncc will incvitably suffcr.~ The investor would 
havc high individual costs if he or shc had to supervise thc tirms providing invest-
m~nt scrviccs. '~ 1 The state-run authority would clcarly reducc such costs. Thc highcr 
thc probability of falsc Information, thc highcr thc prccautionary cxpcnses thc 
inwstor would havc to pay . '*~ Of course with state-run supcrvision, thc invcstor can 
trust that thc basic Standards will bc supcrviscd through thc lcgislaturc and from a 
public authority."J Because private authoritics are often lcss cffcctive at sanction-
ing. administrative law supcrvision is superior. Thc banks' and markct's ability to 
runction is gcncrally essential for a functioning cconomy. lt is thcrcforc a public 
'' Akt.:rlof. X~ ().J .Et.!oll . ..tXX. -4~() ( 1\}70); Köml~..:n. AcP .106 (2006). pp 4 77. S II. 
•' ~ icmcycr. at hup:l:swopcc.hhs.sc:Jhastd/ papcrSihastciU4M2.pdf. sec 46 cl S\l~ · 
... Uafin. t't:ur~r Rt!porl !006 (2007). p 214 . 
•. t\ I this timt.:. X4 (>\:fCC!nl or thc custs an: tinanc..:d through th~ apportionmc:nt prlX:c:durc. Sl!l! ~ 16 
hnDAti ( fn . X I}. 
·• hnancial scrvice providers. which uffercd tinancial portfolio managcment. decrcased from 1.4 73 
111 I ':NX lo 5117 in 2000. ßAKrcd. Yt'ur~~· Rqw rf. !IH)(J {2001 ). pp 100. In 2006. thcn; wcrc: still 7 30 tinan-
Cial scn icc rrovit.lt.:n; subjcd to supcrvision. sce ßarin. t't'ur/y Rt!iJflrl !1}1)6 , op eil, p 133 . 
·- For lhc litluciary characlcr: Wcichl!rtlWenningc:r. WM 12007) pp 627. 634; t=or the principal agc:nt 
problcm sec Ntcmcycr. op e il. at http ://swop<c .hhs.sl!lhash:t:'papcrs~hastero4R~ .pdt: pp 25. '!.7 .:t sqq. 
•• N icmc:ycr. op ..:it. 
·II Posncr. t:nmomic Anu(o;si.~ of L11w (7th ec.l. 21)07). § 15 .10. p 4!i4. 
•: Mahuncy. 7M Va.L.Rcv. 623. 630 et S4.!4· (1992) . 
.. , S..:c Ucnidc.c. Wt!ripcJpit!rn>rnu)gt!n.n·f!n,·ultzmg (2006). p ~84 for the Coc.Jc: of Best Pr • .u.:tice of Art. 
II oi thc Sccuritics S..:rvicl%s Dir\.'\:tivc (fn. -lO). 
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good that thc state has to protcct. As a rcsult. it is cspccially cmphasizcd in thc cor-
rcsponding capital markct law lcgislation.'J-1 Statc-run institutions rcgularly posscss 
bcttcr intcrvcntion and sanctioning mcchanisms than private organizations. Thc 
BaFin can issuc cautions, announce fincs, publish thc mcasurcs takcn, deliver thc 
action to thc Stuutsunwu/1 (Statc Prosccutor) and bar pcoplc in thc profcssion in 
cascs of untrustworthincss. Conscqucntly, statc-run supcrvision hclps to savc total 
social costs. Thc markct's ability to function should hdp to dctcr thc dangcr of a 
crisis from individual cconomics. This is ultimatcly thc rcason why thc supcrvision 
in capital markct law through institulians using administrative law docs not havc 
thc samc forcc as pl!rhaps thc doctor-paticnt rclationship. Hcalth is indccd a highcr 
lcgally protcctcd intcrcst than propcrty; the laborious statc-run supcrvision is jus-
tificd howcvcr bccausc cxpcricncc has taught that cnlirc cconomics induding lhc 
total assets of all invcstors can bc affcctcd. 
111. Publicution uf Public Luw 1'-'!easures (su -c:alled Slwming) 
Whcn using public law mcasurcs to regulatc onc has to cnsurc that thc control is 
acccpted by thc markct participants, makcs thc pricc as cfticicnt as possiblc anu 
finally is flexible cnough to bc adaptcd to thc markct dcvclopmcnt.'~~ ln thc past. 
thc BaFin did not publish its sanctioning dccisions, with thc cffcct that thc public 
did not lcam who had infringcd thc rcquircmcnts of thc WpHG. Bccausc thc BaFin 
wants to hclp dctcr thc formation of inappropriatc cxchangc priccs through thc 
Supervision and pcnalization of insidcr offcnccs, protcction of thc offender cannot 
cross its mind.'~11 Through thc implcmcnlation of thc Markct Abusc Dircctivc··~. thc 
BaFin is now authorizcd to publish thc mcasurcs and sanctions it has madc rcgard-
ing violators of thc rc4uircmcnts of thc WpHG . ln the yearly rcport of thc BaFin. 
companics arc also namcd which havc brcachcd thc WpHG.'"' Publication is not 
complctcly unproblcmatic bccausc on thc onc hand dctcrrcncc should indccd bc 
rcachcd with thc publication, but on thc othcr hand a disproportionatcly high dam-
agc can occur to thc offender or to thc capital markct.'~'~ ln addition. knowlcdgc of 
thc otTcnscs alleviates the cnforccmcnt of claims in civil law. 10" Thc considcration 
of cconomic dclibcration was forcefully phrascd in thc following tcrms by the 
lcgislaturc in§ 40b WpHG: .. Thc Fcdcral Agcncy can publically divulgc incontcst-
ablc mcasurcs on thcir wcbsitc, which it has madc bccausc of thc infringcmcnt uf 
prohibitions or obligations or this lcgislation. inasmuch as this is appli~abk or 
_.. S~c thc pri!VIOUS fn . 35 I![ S4q. 
~, For thcS\: rc4uircmcnts. ~I! N1ctncycr. hllp:liswopc~: .hhs.scthastl!fipa(')\!rsihastl'ID4lC .pdf. l. 45. 
... Rcgarding this 'riticism. sec Möllers. Zß8 12003 ). pp 3'10. 40X. 
•' ~ 40b WpHG 1mpkmc:ntcd art. 14 par. 4 of thc Marker Abusc Dirc~tiv..: (lil . 4.\). ln thc mcan-
tunc, stmilar won.ling ~an tx toond in An. 51 par. 3 MiFiD (fn . 43); An. 2M par. 2 Tran:.pan:n9 f>•rc..:· 
tivc {fn. 76). 
"" For thc mdtvidual procc:ss.:s, s.:c instructivcly Barin. >'~turlr R~tporl !tJflfl. op cit, pp I b 7 cl :-.41} . 
.,. BachmanniPrtUC!r, ZRP {2005). pp llW. IIJ; rh:ischcr. lGR {2004). pp 437. 47t>; Altcnham. in 
KK-WpHG (2007). § 40b marginal nwn~r I. 
••u flcischcr, lGR (2004). pp 437. 477: Molkrs, /.IJIJ (~003), pp 3'XJ. ·WS . 
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nccdcd and for the climination or prcvcntion of gricvanccs according to § 4 para 2 
s. 2, unlcss thc publication would cxtensively cndanger thc financial market or Iead 
to disproportionatc darnage for thc partics." 101 
In othcr publications, such an obligation to considcr cannot to bc found.w2 Indccd, 
it could bc argucd thc multitude of imprccisc conccpts of law would inhibit an cfti-
cicnt appli_fation of thc norm. Admittcdly, in thc past thc administrationwas alrcady 
in thc position to dcfinc such articlcs. Morcovcr, indetinitc concepts of law com-
plicatc thc avoidancc offcnccs and raisc with it thc dctcrrencc cffcct.1'J3 
c. The lnterpluy vf Privute and Public Gvvernam:e 
1. Prinlle Legislation: Compliance and lhe Running vf a Register vf Insiders 
Implcmcnting private rcgulation is on thc tip of evcryonc's tonguc again in thc 
form of private govcmance. Bccausc govcmmcntal authorities are coming on thcir 
Iimits. it makcs quitc a Iot of sense economically to usc private mcasurcs. The 
conccpt of private Jcgislation is uscd whcn private organizations makc laws. it~ In 
comparison to thc abovemcntioncd cxclusivc monitoring by thc stock cxchangc. 
thc modern form of private govcmancc in capital market law can bc distinguishcd 
in that thc govcmmcnt is thc final oversccr of thc rcgulations and legal enfon:c-
mcnt. ror ycars, thc lcgislaturc has obligcd thc finns providing invcstmcnt scr-
vic~s in thc sccuritics ficld to cstablish intcmal controls in order to supervise thc 
n.:sponsibilitics of thc tirms thcmsclvcs, § 33 par. 1 numbcr 3 WpHG. 1'1\ Listcd 
companics must compilc an in~idcr dircctory, § l5b WpHG. However, thc manda-
lory intcgration of compliancc mcchanisms or insidcr dircctorics crcatcs ncw costs 
fl)r thc listcd companics. 1 '>~> To balancc thcsc additional costs. thc legislaturc tricd 
to choosc a solution that is as cconomical as possible. lt did not ddinc mandatory 
rulcs. rather lcavcs thc companics tlcxibility in implcmcnting thc requircmcnts. ~·~~ 
Thc covcragc of thc compliancc mcchanisms for thl.! tinns providing invcstmcnt 
scrviccs in thc sccuritics ticld 10" or thc administration of insidcr dircctorics for 
···· ltali~s aJd..:J. 
·: l'ornparo: similarly ~ ·H ßür:.li 
.... l'hat ni~:d; darifit:s par. lU (b) SEA 111 ~:onnc..:t10n wuh rulc IOb-5 tn l.J .S. law. so:c fn. 1211. 
· ·• S~:hwartz. 97 :-.lw .l' . l.Ro.:v. 31') 0.:1 SlN- (2002); Kir~:hhof. Private Rechlst!l::wtg ( 19X7). p 107. 
l'ump;.m: also lngd . ..1 Con.lftlttlronal Fnrmc!1wrk /or l'ri1·ate 0'm ·t'mann•, ~!PI-Paper. 2001 ,4. pp 4 
..:1 '44 .. .14 ct SlJ'-t 
'"' Bascc.l on Art. I 0 scnh:n~c 2 lirst 1n1knt Sccurit1cs Ex..:hangc 0Jrc~:llvc ( fn. 40) anJ..·or art 13 
rar.~ :..llfi() lln. tliJ). 
··•· Clü-MagaLin (unlinc cJition) talks of 5.5 billion US dollars tor Compl1ancc costs alonc m 2005 
1 http: Iwww .~io.J~ncws/XOXI}72ilndc.,.hllnl). hom consiJo:rablc aJministr.ltlvc cxpcnso.:s sec Scthc. in 
:\s~m:Jnn:S~:hncitkr. HjJ/I{j (4th cc.l .. 2006). ~ 15b marginal numbcr 46; llcinrid. in KK-Wpi/G * ~007 
~ 15b nwrginal numbcr 5. 
,.,. This is difti:rcnt Jqx:nJing on tho.: siN uf thc lirrn: for anJ ova-.. icw sec 13A W 1!, Yt!arly Rt'pul'l 
.!tJtJ! (20031. pp 71J .:1 SlJ4· 
""' Kolla. m Assmann;Schnc1c.lcr. Wp/IC, op cit. § 33 marginal numbcr 35 . 
EFfiCIENCY AS A STANDARD IN CAPITAL MARKET LAW (200\}j EBLR 257 
listcd companics rcspcctivcly is som~what dcpcndcnt on thc sizc of thc company.'"' 
These rulcs do not only aim at bcttcr supcrvision. rather at thc dctcrrcncc as weil: 
thc company should bc urgcd to kccp thc numbcr of pcoplc that can comc in con-
tact with insidcr infonnation as small as possiblc.110 With thc insidcr dircctory. thc 
intcgrity of thc markct and in turn thc invcstor's contid~ncc in this markct should 
bc strcngthcncd in thc end. 111 
ii. Legul fmplementution throuxh Fimmcial Auditurs und the Superl'ision (~( !IIC: 
Super'l.'isvrs 
Compliancc rulcs arc tirst supcrviscd intcmally in a company tor cxamplc through 
thc compliancc ofticcr. In addition, an option that could bc considcrcd wouiJ bc 
that private organizations would undcrtakc th~ monitaring dutics and thcsc thcn 
would bc supcrviscd by statc-run authoritics. This approach has bccn cmploycd for 
ycars in fultilling thc idca of"lcss govcrnmcnt." '': lt tinds c.xprcssion for cxamplc 
in § 36 WpHG which rcquircs that tirms providing invcstmcnt s~.:rvic..:cs in thc sc-
curitics ticld bc cxamincd annually by tinancial auditors. lnct>rrcct administration 
of an insidcr dircctory can bc punishcd as a misdcmcanor. ~ 39 par. 2 numbcr ~ 
WpHG . 1 " This thcrcforc hclps to makc thc rcgulations cftkicnt bccausc thcy ap-
provc public and criminal law mcasurcs alongsidc private supcrvision. Thc nl..!wly 
implcmcntcd cnforccmcnt proccdun; for tinam:ial statcmcnts in ~ 342b H(lß (in 
conncction with § 37n \VpHG) works in a similar manncr. Thc Financial Rcporting 
Enforccmcm Pand (Priij.5telle ßir Rechmmx~lcgrmg DPR) cxamincs thc annual 
rcports of listcd companics in advance; thc BaFin acts whcn thc company r~.:fusc) 
w coopcratc with thc DPR or rcjccts thc tindings or its cxamination: · t 
:." rur ~ 15b \\'piiG s.:c HcgrE li\H· \l.pAIV. Sec S tu Sc.: . l~. tounJ undcr hup \\\\\d1.1l! n. 
<.h::' crunJnungclltwpaiv . bcg.pdf Sec alsu I h:1nrid1. m A."/\· l~iJ/I(i t 2007 ). ~ 15 m..~rgmal numbcr \,l 
ct ~qq . 
"· Scthc . 1n Assmann·Sc.:hnc1dcr. WpfiG. \lp ctl, ~ 15b lllJr~ln:.tl nu111bcr ~h lk1nrh.:h. 111 
1\1\- Hp}Ui. ~ 2007 * 15b marginal numbcr ~: fur thc custs ut' thc duty tu Jtsdo:.c sec abu l:a:-.h:rbnl\>1.. 
ri~.:hd. flrt: l:.'t'ollomlt.' Structur< •d Corporat~· l.cJw. op ~11. pp 309 ..:t sqq. 
" 1 Recital 12 \lark.l!l Abusc Dirc.:c.:tivl! ( fn . 43) and R.:dtal 6 l111ph:mcntat in~=: D1rc.:t1-.~ :!004. 7 2 EC 
r'rom 4.21J.:!004. OJ Nr. L 162. 7U. lkinnch. 111 A·K-WpiiG. § ::!007 ~ 15b Ol.Jrginalnumlxr 5 
111 For thc impkmcntattOn. onc:: ava1 ls h101 or hcßdi of 1hc so-calkd "loancr~ ... pcP.-on .:h;Hc,:.:l! 
with tultilling statc thc ~tatc: tunct1on . .sec ~töllcrs, Rc.!t'lrt.,~Jifl•rs, ·iwr: un l../m\\dt- und 1/,Jjltlllg." ·t·, h: 
( li.J96), pp 332 ct s~q . 
' 11 For lhc:: sh:ps in an mfrin!\cmclll of ~ .H \l·i pllG. sc.: ~lcycr • l'acl.t.cl. 10 1\K - lliJi /(i ( :!lXii I mar· 
gtnal numbcr 1 15 ct ~4 · 
; .. Sec Uaumbach.JiupL \1c::rkt, 1/v'lJ (32nd cd . 2006!. ~ 342b margmal numb..:r 3 ct ~qq So:c J ls..., 
th..: graph in Bahn. Y<urly R.·pnrt JtHJ6. op c.:ll. p ll<'J. 
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w . Examples uf /nej)ective Supervision 
I. Thc Double-Examination in thc Scopc of the Enforccmcnt Action 
Multilevel supervision of this kind howcver can also be incffectivc. The enforcc-
mcnl proccdurc Ieads to an incfficicnt double-cxamination bccause accountants 
t.:ommissiofl.ed by the board of dircctors have already inspected the annual accounts 
of thc company, § I I l par. 2 scntcncc 3 AktG. 115 Financial accountants, according 
to * 36 WpHG, indcpendently examine adherence to the rules in §§ 3 t ct seq. 
WpHG rcgarding thc finns rcsponsibilitics, although indcpcndent financial accoun-
tants havc alrcady cxamined thc tinancial Statements during the cnforccmcnt pro-
ccdurc. lfthc BaFin would dircctly confirm thc rcports ofthe financial accountants 
commissioncd by thc companics, this would have scrics of advantagcs : 116 a doublc-
cxamination of thc annual accounts by financial accountants Ieads incvitably to 
additional (transactional-) costs. lndcpcndencc is grcatcr with a govcmmcntal au-
thority than with private financial accountants, with the result being that it is trust-
cd morc than a sccond inspcction by financial accountants. 117 Thc current German 
systcm is unknown in othcr Europcan Mcmber States. Dircct supervision through 
thc BaFin would bc likc thc U.S. 's inspcction by thc SEC. Conscqucntly, it would 
thcrdorc be ctlicicnt if. de legeferendu, thc ccrtificatcs ofthc financial accountants 
commissioncd by thc board of dircctors would bc examincd dircctly by thc BaFin 
as thl! statl!-run supcrvisory board. 
2. Thl! Supervision of Fin<mcial Analysts through thl! German Press Council 
Thc Markct Abusc Dircctivc noticcably tightcned the rcquircmcnts for thc financial 
analysts. Financial analysts must disclosc conditions that could crcatc contlicts of 
intcrl!sts togcthcr with thc thcir tinancial analysis, § 34b WpHG. 11 " According to 
Europcan and German Jaw, this docs , howcvcr, not apply to joumalists. inasmuch 
as thcy an.: subjcct to a similar intcmal rcgulation including cffective control mcch-
anisms."" With this provision. thc frccdom of thc press was supposcd to bc ap-
pcascd.': .. ln thc mcantimc, the German Press Council has however rcviscd thc 
pn.:ss codc (Pressekodex).'~ ' This mcthod of implcmcnting laws has two gravc 
11 ' S~.:hulzc-Ostcrloh, Dt'r Knn:t-m (2004 ). pp 173. I H2 and th~: aulhur in fn . 116 cl ~4 · 
.... 131>\:king. BJ-'111' (2004). pp 26M. 169; ll irtci~lock, in KK-WpHG. § 37n marginal numbcr 46. 
" · l.cnt.iBaucr, BFuP (2002), pp 246, 252. 2o0: ß«Xking, ZFBF (2003). PP6~3 . 702: Schulzi!·Üstcr-
Juh. /Jcr 1\on:an (:!004). pp 173. 1M2. 
"' ~ .14 para. I ~o. 2 WpliG in ~:onnc~:tion with ~ 5 Finam~analyscVO from 12.17.2004. BGBI. I 
pp .1522 Basedun Art. () par. 5 Marlo...:t AbuSI! Dire~riv..: 1 fn . 43) as wc:ll as rhc: lmph:m..:ntation Dirc~:· 
11v..: ~OOJt!:2.:i;EC frorn 12.22.2ll03. OJ Nr. L JJtJ, 73 . For lhis and turthc:r duli~s. sec: :'IAölkrs. in KK-
Il'pll<.i t2007), § 34b marginal numbcr 151 ..:t sq'{. 
"" ~ H Ahs. -l WpiiG based on Art. 2 par. 4. J par. 3. 5 par. 5 lmpkmcntallon Dire~:tivc ~OO)tl 25 ' 
El' (fn. IIK). 
o: .. For thc: U.S. pr..:wn;or. ~..: Rdcasl! No. 33 -X IIJJ , hllp :l/www .sc~:.go .. iruksltinalt33-X 193.htm; 
hk No. S7-30-02 SEC. 
•:• /)rt!.~ ... ttlwJI!x (Journalistil.: prin~tpks) of the German Prc)s Coun(;il from 3.2.2006. found undc:r 
'' w w. pr..:sS\!rat.dc:. 
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disadvantagcs though: First, thc press codc as a formal sanction is only forcsccn 
as a public rcprobation; an additional monctary tinc or disbanncnt from thc orga-
nization would clcarly bc morc cffcctivc. Sccond, cxclusivcly private supcrvision 
has proved to bc lcss ctlcctive. as was shown with thc supcrvision of thc stock 
cxchangc. This centrot dcgcncrates hcrcwith to thc statc sccn in thc 1990s.•n Thcrc-
forc, thc rcgulation should - on thc Europcan Ievel as weil - bc changcd so that 
govcrnmcntal Supervision is implemcntcd at least on a subordinatc Ievel. Thc priv-
ilcgc of journalists with stock cxchangc manipulation is clcarly morc cffcctivc. 
§ 20a par. 6 WpHG . Thc Supervision through thc BaFin is continucd. howcv~r. 
taking thc profcssional particularitics into account. 1 ~-1 
J. Civil Law Liability 
i. Empirical Data Regarding Ad Hot.: Public:atiuns 
Public law Supervision th~ough thc BA Wc (Bundesaujsichtsamtfiir den Wertpa-
pierhandel) and thc BaFin havc dctinitcly lcd tu a signi ticant incrcasc of ad hm: 
publicationsY" Many of thcsc ad hoc publications wcrc pure PR mcasurcs and . if 
anything, disguiscd thc cconomic situation rather than appropriatcly rcprcscnting 
it. Thc lcgislaturc thus feit constraincd to intcrvcnc and outlaw dcccptiv~ statc-
mcnts .•~s ln the past, thc sccuritics as weil as thc stock Jaws staycd csscntiully lav.; 
in thc books. Bctwccn 1995 and 2001, only twclvc cascs lcd to thc imposition of 
fincs and in thrcc cases tumed ovcr to thc public prosccutor. ·~·· ln thc mcantimc, 
although thc BaFin has actcd morc and morc routindy. gapsstill cxist. Ncithcr th~ 
public prosccutor nor thc BaFin havc had thc manpower until now to cxtcnsivcly 
follow up on capital markct fraudY 7 for this rcason, thc Bafin. a.s it has pointcd 
out, is continually dcpcndcnt on thc collaboration of private partics . 1 !~ 
ln thc U.S .. thc possibility to tilc a civil lawsuit for ina~:curatc infonnat ion by 
1
: : ln add ition. wi th th~: 672 ~ubmitt.:d complaints m 200*. only 27 rcprunanJs wen: issul.!d. 'icc !"ur 
this prcsscrJt.dc (as of 5.2.2006); sec Miillas. in KK-WpiiG 2007. ~ 34b margmal nurober 232. 
m § 20a par. 6 WpiiG statcs: " t=or joumalis ts acting in thc cxcrclsc of tho:1r vccupation. thc ..:'i~ ­
h:nc.: of thc: n:quiro.:mcnts according to par. I s. I No. I is h.l bc judg..:d unJ..:r ..:onsiJcr.JIIOO or thc tr 
professional rcgulations. unless thesc: pl!r.wns. through talsc or d-.:ccptivc !>latcmcnts. J in:ctl:y ur •nll•-
rc~.:tly bcnl!tit or makc protits." 
1:• Sec thc prcvious fn . 66. 
11' Compar~ § I 5 par. I Sl!n t.:ncc 6, par. ~ scnh.:ncc: I WpHG; for th1s ~1olkrs. in Mülkrs:Kottcr. 
Ad-lw,·-Puhli:itüt (2003 ). § 3 m:1rginal numbcr I 3. 
•:• BA Wc, Yeur~r R~JXJrt :mJI (2002). p 5'j; forthis sec Roller. in ~lülkrs,- Runcr . . -ld-ho,·-l'uhli:ittil . 
op c it. § II m<~rginal numbcr I. For Comroad. lnfomatt."\: and E~1.TV sec ~1ölkrs:L~.:isch. in 1\A'-UiJJ/0. 
(2007) §§ 37b. c marginal numbcr 5 I ct ~q . 
1 : ~ t=or thl! I!Xccssivc: Jemands on thc: public prosccutor, s~ ~tölkr-s. WM (2002). p 309; Altcnha1n. 
WM (2002). pp IH74. IX75; l.:nzcn, 7.88 (2002), pp 271.J, :!MO; rcccntly also Bcnickc:. JJ'aiJMJli<·r.w · 
mii~msnmmltung ( ~006 ). p M07. 
I!& According to sratcmcnts by lhc: OaFin. rt:arly Rt:porl !()1}6 (20071. p I hJ. l lps lrom IO .. C!>IOI'S 
havc Joublcli m comparison to prc\ 1ous ycar.;. 
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I istcd companics has cxistcd for morc than twenty yearsY" In Francc, multiple 
cascs havc also bccn dccided. 130 In Gennany, claims for inaccurate ad hoc publi-
cations arc govcrncd by spccial laws, §§ 37b,c WpHG. Claims stcmming from 
§ H26 ßGB or § 400 AktG in conncction with § 823 par. 2 BGB arealso concciv-
ablc. Whcthcr further infonnation requircmcnts contain protection charactcristics 
within thc mcaning of § 823 par. 2 BGB is heavily debated, for examplc with 
rcgards to Insider violationsD1, markct manipulation132, dircctor dcalings133 or thc 
administratlon of insider dircctories.134 Until now, civil law actions have not ariscn 
vcry oftcn for damages claims. This is seen principally in the affairs of Infonnatcc, 
EM.TV and Comroad. Howevcr, aftcr civil law liability of inaccurate ad hoc 
publications was rccognized by the Gennan Fcderal Court of Justicem, deccptive 
~~ Civil law darnage claims can. in the case of injury from the capital market publication duties, 
bc bascd on both Sec. 10 {b) SEA in conncction with Rule lOb-5 as weil as Sec. 18 (a) SEA. Juris-
prudcn~l! and rclated Iiterature have extensively developed the legal practices in th.: last 30 years for 
c.Jarnag\!s, causation, as weil as the subjcctive requircments for Rule lOb-S. see for inst.ance Kurdon v . 
.V,Jticmul G)p.wm Cu., 69 ct sqq. Supp 512 ( 1946); Superintendent vf /nsurum:e v. Bunkers Life & Cusu-
al~\· Co .• 404 U.S. 6, 92 S.Ct. 16.5. 30 L.Ed.2d 128 ( 1971 ); Hermun & Muc:Leun v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
3 75. )NO ( 1983 ); 8CJSic: v. Levinwn. 4K5 U.S. 224, 241 - 249 ( 1988). for an ovcrview see for imJtancc 
lla:.G\!n. The Law vf Se,·urities Regulutiuns (4th cd. 2002), pp .568 et sqq.; (5th cd. 2005 ), Chap. 12.12. 
pp 52 1 ct sqq.; fl~ischer, Opinion F fvr tht! 64 . DJT (2002), pp I 00 et sqq.; Schulte, in Möllers/Roth:r, 
.~d-hoc-Publi:itiit , op eil, § 6 marginal num~r 47 et sqq., Kulms, in HopVVoigt, Pruspe/<1- und Kupi-
talmurli.tlwjiunJ: (2005), pp 1101 et sqq. 
1 ~' CA Paris (15 Jan 1992). Ga:t. Pal. (23 Apr 1992}, 293. nute Marchi; Cass. crim. (15 Mar 1993). 
lJull. crim. n I 13. pp 2!!0: Bull. Joly Boursc ( 1993). 365, note Jeantin; CA Paris ( 18 0\.'<: 1995), Banque 
.:1 dro11 n 4X. (Jui-Aug 1996). 35, chron . Pelrierlcle Vuupla11e; CA Paris (30 Apr 1997). Rev. sc . crim. 
{Jan-Mar l'i9lJ). 121}, notc Riffault; T. corr. Paris, ( 17 Dcc 1997). Bull. Joly Boursc: ( 1998), 121, nute 
L~sgUIIIicr; T. corr. Paris. (27 feb 1998), RTD com. (Jui-Aug 1998), 640, notc Rontchevsky; CA Paris. 
{X Oct llJlJlJ). RD bancairc: ct linancier (Jan-Fc:b 2000). 34. ('ass. crim. ( 15 May 1997). D. affain:s 
1 IIJIJ7). 924; sec also Flcischcr/Jänig RIW 1002. 129 c:t sqq. 
" 1 ~ IJ WpiiG. Negative ~cause of the missing evidcnce of causation according to thl! t:tli:c-
tiv..: law sec Assmann. in Assmann/Schneidcr, WpiiG, op dt. § 13 marginal numbcr 20!:! ct sqq. ln 
rhc U.S., civil law liability in insider tr.lding is imaginable. Based on the Insider Trading and Securi-
tics Fr.sud Enforccmcnt Act IIJK8, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(a). evidence of precise causation is not neccs-
sary. bccausc it is suOicic:nt that at thc same time thc! insider bought andlor sold. See In Rt! Amc:ricun 
IJu.~illt:ss Cumputer:r Corp. Sec:urities Regulutiun Ligitutiun. 1994 WL 848690 [ 1995 Transfer BinnerJ 
h:s.Scc.l.Pn.:. (CCII) S.l).N.Y. 1994: "Contl!mJ><>rancously" may embrace the entin: pc:riod while rev-
cnant insidc information n:mains undisclosed;" see lfazcn, The Law of Securities Regull.ltions, op eil, 
Chap. 12.17. p S4H. 
111 ~ lOa WpllG. Seen as negative by Vogel, in J\ssmann/Schncidcr, WpHG, op cit, § 20a mar-
ginal numbcr 19; a cliflcrcnt vicw by Mock/StoiVEutinger. in KK-WpHG {2007), § 20a marginal num-
bcr 432. ror thl! dispule stanJing s\!c Möllcrs/Lcisch. in KK-WpHG (2007), §§ 37b, c marginal numb<:r 
455 fn . M67. 
111 § 15a WptiG. Seen a.s negativ~ by tleinrich, in KK-WpHG (2007), § JSa marginal numbc:r M2; 
S..:th..:, in Assmann/Schnei\lcr, WpHG. op cit, § 15a marginal numbc:r 114; Zimmer. in ~hwark, K,\/RK 
(3rJ ~d .• 2004), ~ ISamarginal numb~r 47. 
1
'"' § I Sb WpiiG. Seen as negative by Scthe. in Assmann!Schnc:ider, WpHG, op cit, § !Sb mar-
gmal num~r 7H. 
l.l ' BGII from 7. 11}.2004, II ZR 40li02, BGHZ 160. 149 - lnfomatec 1; BGH irom 7.19.2004, II 
Z~ 2 11!iU3, li( j llZ 160, 134 - lnfomatcc II; ßGH from 7.19.2004. 11 ZR 217103. NJW (2~). 266M-
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ad hoc publications havc gonc down. In addition, thc possibility now cxists with 
the Investors' Joint Action Act (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz- KapMuG )L't~ 
to lcgally clarify a dccision in a joint action for all partic::; with a "tcst casc. "ll7 Thc 
proceedings in Deutsche Telekom and Daimlcr Chryslcr havc shown thc cffcctivc-
ness of this option in lowcring thc hurdlcs to Iitigation. IJII 
11. Econvmic Considerations 
I. Compcnsatory Damages and Prcvcntion 
Frequcntly, an investorwill purchasc shares bccausc of incorrcct infonnation pub-
lished by the listcd company. Claims for damages are thcn thc only way in indi-
vidual cascs to removc the dircct conscqucnces causcd by thc brcach of thc duty 
to disclose. Public law cannot achieve this darnage compensation. Accordingly, 
darnage liability scrvcs classically to compcnsatc for damagcs. (t is thcrcfore of 
considerable importance tbat precisely that person, who has thc grcatcst intcrcst in 
guarantecing protcction, is givcn an cffcctivc legal tool in his or her hand: the in-
jurcd investor him or hcrsclf. 139 The private claim for damagcs makes thc sclf-in-
tcrcsts of thc solitary injured invcstor uscful for the implemcntation of thc dutics .•.w 
He or she bccomcs a private attomcy. 141 The claims of private partics suppkmcnt 
statc Supervision and bccomc particularly important whcn thc supervision through 
thc statc is not sufficiently effective. Whcn accountability to private invcstors is 
non-cxisting, further social costs arisc: thc invcstor carrics thc risk of dcccption 
and loses his or her invcstment, thc dishonest company squandcrs rcsourccs to 
conccal thc truc circumstanccs 1 ~! and dutiful companics must makc substantial cx-
pcnditurcs in order to rcgain lost invcstor contidcncc and as thc casc may bc ovcr-
Iotomatee 111: ln lnfomatcc lillil ll thc t:edernl Court of Justicc artinncd liability lor omisswn~ '10lating 
morality (for morc dctails Sc:e Möllers, 30 Journal of lntdl L. & Com. Rcg. 279, 303 ct ~'-t .(200·"l); 
s1..~ further ~GU from 5.9.2005, NJW 2005. 2450- EM.TV ; BGH trom 5.9.2005. OLG Frankfurt a.M. 
from 3.17.2005, ZIP 2005, 710- Comroad I; OlG MOnchc:n from 4.20.2005, ZIP 2005. lJO\ - Comruad 
II. For an overview see Möllcrs/Leisch, in KK-WpHG, § 2007 §§ 37b. c marginal numbcr 51 1!1 sqq. 
lll> law for lhe implemcntation of invc:stors' joint aclion frum 8 .16.2005. Uül31. I. pp 2437. s..:c for 
this Braun/Rotter, 8KR (2004). 296; Duve/Pfitzner, 88 (2005), 673; Hess, WM (2004), 2329; llc~s; 
Mich<t il idou, ZIP (2004). p 1381; McJIIc:rs/Wcichcrt, NJW (2005 ). p 273 7 .:t sq4.; Rcuschlc. Du.~ A:upituf. 
anleger-Musterwrjilhrtmsgeset: (2006); Hess/Rcuschlc/Veil (llrsg.}. KK-Kup,\/u(j (2007). 
111 That can bc: th~ fault of cupital marltet infonnation. 
tla LG rr.tnklurt a.M. frum 7.1 1.2006. ZIP {2006). p 1730- "Test ca:sc" rcgarding thc IOCOrTI..'Cln\."SS 
of the prospcctus of Telekom during its third public o!Tcring; LG Stullgart from 7 .3.2006, Zl P (2006). 
p 1731 - ·'T 1."1il caS~:" rcgarding timeliness ofthc: :ui hoc publication com:cming thc rcsignation of Oaim-
krChrysl~r's CEO. The decision of the O~rlandcsgericht Stuttgart from 2.15.2007. WM (:2007). p 5M5 
wilh commenls by MOIIcrs/Weichert, EWiR (2007). p 285 el :Ktq.; Fleischer, fJB (2007), p .Wl cl S(N· 
"~ Lcisch, in Möllcr:VRottcr. Ad-hu<.·-Puhli:itüt (2003 ). § 16 marginal num~r 3: Lenzen. ZBB 
{2002). pp 279, 21W. 
140 See lhe previous fn. 135. 
1• 1 ror mon: infonnation on this conccpt stcmming frum U .S. civillibcrty law suits sec ,v,."."""' v. 
Pigxie Purk Enterprise.~. 390 U .S. 400 ( 196~ ). 
·~~ Posncr, E,·unumit· ..fn<J(rsi.f uf L<Jw (7th cd. 2007), § 15 .1 0, p 41!4. 
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for this dccision. 151 Ccrtain forms of bchavioral scicncc bclong to this, which an: 
thc matter of bchavioral tinance.1H Also gcneral markct risk. i.c. thc risk of not 
obtaining the desircd profits due to gcncral pricc loss, for cxample causcd by tcrror 
attacks, must be carricd by thc invcstor. 1 ~.t 
Ovcr-dctcrrcnce is claimcd bccausc, unlikc for instancc in compctition law, thc 
person that has rclcascd false infonnation docs not neccssarily draw thc according 
gains from it. Rathcr, third partics oftcn rcccivc thc gains. Thc macrocconomic 
dcad wcight Iosses are thcrcforc lowcr than thc total of thc indiv idual Iosses bccausc 
a corresponding gain of a different investor stands in contrast to cvcry personal 
loss. 1 ~~ Finally, ovcr-detcrrcncc is spokcn of whcn thc rcporting duties and sccond-
ary requirements involvcd with a brcach of duty risc to thc Ievei that thc costs of 
an initial public offcring clcarly cxcccd thc advantagcs of a listing . 1~~ 
Howcvcr, thc thcory of ovcr-dcterrence can bc rcbutted by two considcrations: 
ln thc introduction, it was shown that the capital markct is espccially worthy of 
protection. Thcrcforc, not only thc costs of thc currcntly injurcd partics must bc 
considcred. but also thc costs that arise from invcstors not invcsting in thc sccuri-
ties markct. These social costs arc composed of thc total of all thc tinam:ial prc-
cautionary costs 1 St~ as wcll as thc total of all thc darnage costs.'~~ Prccautionary 
cxpcnditurcs should hcncc bc uscd only as long as a rcduction of darnage costs 
rcsults that is at least cqually as largc. 1 ~M Furthcrmorc. prccautionary costs dcpcnd 
on thc probability of assertion: thc smallcr thc probability of asscrtion. thc low~r 
thc macrocconomic cfticicncy. Thc thcory of ovcrcompensation is conscqucntly to 
bc cxamincd in light of thc asscrtion ofthat right. abovc all thc likclihood of asscr-
tion .'~·· 
' ' 1 CJ::.ually wmJ~:d by Lo::.s. LJ/R /:!CJ 1 lo,l6C.J1. pp 1'17. 20~ .. w.-r.·d nglu tu 111c1k,· '' '"'''"' ,,",._ 
.l't!lj'" . 
•" l1kc.: fur 1nstan ~:c "knunings" blindly lollu..,..ing rc~.:onHnc.:m.IJtiun=> of allc.:gcd tin an~.:sal g.uru:.. ~~.:~.: 
gcnc.:rally lor B~lta~·iorul Finc.mc~: fur c.::-t:unplc Thakr ( llr>g. ). Ad• ,",r.·s ;" Bl'fw, .,,,wJ Fmrmn·'· ,.", 
I (I tl93 ). vul. I I (2005 ); Gulubc.:rgfvon N itl.sch. B~hm·iorol Fi"'mn: 14th ~J .. !004 ): 1-'h.:Jsdt..:r. in 1-'S 
/11111/t:l /gcl (2004). PP 575 c.:t S44· 
·~ ·' S~c.: Engdhardt, BKR (2006), p 447. 
·~ See thc namcd authors 10 fn . I ~3 as wdl as Pusncr. fnmmnic ..lna~\ ·si.'i o/ l..tw. op ei l. * 15. I 0. 
pp 4~3 t!l s~q.; Saua. LBB. up dt, pp 2-l. 31. Wc1ehcr1. 0.-r Anlt:,;c:r.vchurlt·ll bt'i !i:/lh·rltc~fi<•r 1\apllal-
nu;r/ain/imnlltitm ( Diss. Augsburg 2007 ). p 296. 
r)! ~undamt:ntally to thc tjucstion of thc: eost and rhc.: bcndit of lhc duty Iu rcport ~cc l::astcrbruok 
Fischd, fltt! Enmomic StntUtm: of Corpuru/t! Law ( \4.JIJ I ). pp 30tl Cl Sl.jl.j . 
... s~c fn. I·B . 
" ' Schätcr.Ott, Lt:hrhudt r.la iiiunumisdlt!ll An<J~\·.~c: .J .. ·:. Ltrilrt'Chl.'i, up Cl I, r I~~ . 
•'• l:Jrown,:! J.lc:g.Stuc.l. 323 ct sqq . ( IIJ73). pp 323. 347: SchJI\:riOtt. Lehrhuclt J.·r iikunom i.~t ·h··" 
:lnu~rst: drs Li~·ilr~t ·hts, up cit. S. 130: for thc law uf c.JamOJgc.:s. sec.: thc prcviuu::. fn . 21 and Wagner, 
.·kP !rJ6 (2006). pp 352, -l5X. 
•l• Sec gt:ncrally W:~gm:r, ,·kP ~()() (2006), pp 352.46.1 ..:1 S'N· s..:c also W.:J~:hc.:rt. Altlt:g~:rsthcukn 
h<'l /t:hlt:rl~tl}it:r Kupitulmurlamjornwtion, up cit, pp 2X2 .:1 ~4 · 
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iii. Extending Civil Law Liubility 
I . Extent of Damages 
Whcn publishing inaccurate information, the publisher is liablc for damagcs whcn 
thc rcquircments of § 826 BGB arc fulfillcd. As for thc amount of damages, § 249 
par. I BG~ dictatcs. that a situation be crcated idcntical to the in which no dam-
agcs (brcach of duty) occurred. Oncc this situation is crcatcd- thc brcach of report-
ing dutics arc made as though thcy nevcr cxistcd - two conditions would bc 
imaginable in thc casc of an invcstmcnt dccision. The brcach could havc bcen thc 
~ausc of thc purchasc dccision. If this is thc case, thc claim for damagcs should 
Iead to a rcscission. § 249 par. I BGB contains the principlc of total rcparation 
tound in liability law. Accordingly, casc law involving brcachcs ofreporting dutics 
rcgularly Iead to a rcscission. 160 This, jurisprudence has predominantly met with 
approval. lt is also imaginable that thc invcstor acquircd the papcr without know-
lcdgc of thc inaccurate information. The darnage claims should then bc limitcd to 
thc amount thc invcstor paid too much (sharc value loss). 
Accon!ing to countlcss authors, out of fear of ovcr-detcrrcnce, only the sharc 
valuc loss should bc recovcrablc under §§ 37b, c WpHG and not a rcscission.1" 1 
This thcory is vulnerable howcvcr to three attacks. Even if the prcmise is corrcct 
that darnage compcnsation would bc highcr than thc total damages to thc markct 
participants '"~ . thc social costs mcntioncd in thc introduction must also bc consid-
l.!rcd from an cconomical standpoint, which can be higher than the total damagcs 
to thc invcstors. Morcovcr, thc invcstor can only suc for rcscission whcn hc or shc 
has prcciscly dcmonstratcd buying on account of thc inaccuratc infom1ation. This 
1s only possiblc in thc most scldom cascs bccausc thc plaintiff must provc thc cau-
sation bctwccn misinfonnation and acquisition and/or disposition of thc security. 
Ovcr-dctcrrcncc will thus not bc a thrcat bccausc of thc low likclihood of asscr-
tion. Thc thcory of over-detcrrcncc thereforc tums to dust and emerges as a purely 
thcorctical problcm.163 From an cconomic vicwpoint. it should bc strcsscd that, 
abovc all. thc principal of total reparation will causc thc wrongdocr to practicc thc 
rcquin.:d provisions. 1~ 
... , U(ill rrom 10 .14. 11.)71. U<jHZ 57. 137. 142 ct 544.; B<Jll from 5.17.19Hl. NJW (19M2). pp 2H15, 
2XICI ct --~4 .: (3(111 from 7. 19.2004, II ZR 402J0:!. HGHZ 160. 149, 159- ln!i.)matcc I; HGH from 
5 . lJ .~OU5 . NJW 12005). pp 2450. 2451 ·· EM.TV. 
, .. , Sec. in <.~ddation to thc <.~uthors m fn . 150. also Maicr-Rcimc:r. \\ic:b«!ring. WM (2002). pp1 M57. 
IX611 cl SlJ4.: Riltll!l, A(i (2003). pp b9, 7\J; Zimmer, in Schwark. K.\IRK (3rd cc.J .. 2004). §§ .\7b, 
J 7..: WpiiU marginal numbcr 87 c:t s44.: lloptiVoigt. in HopL'Voigt. Pruspelct- unJ Kupitulmurlain-
Jimlhlliansh(.l_{t lmJ< (2005). pp ~. 12M ct sqq.; Lang~:nbuchc:r, ZJP (2005). pp 239, 240 ct sqq.; Scthc, in 
Assmann/Schncidcr. WpHG (4th cJ .• 2006), B 37b. 37c marginal numbc:r 73 c:t S44· 
••: Sl."c thc prcvious fn . 154. 
,., Mölkrs;Lcisch, in KK-WplfG. (20tH). ** 37b. c marginal numbcr 279. 
,.,.. Coutc:r/Uicn. I.<Jw <Jnd Ecu11um iD (4th cd. 2004). pp 32M ct sqq .; Wagnc::r, .-kP lOf> (2006). 
PP .'52. ~511 . 
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Furthcrmorc, thc asscssmcnts madc through thc law must also bc takcn into 
account. In legal litcraturc, a balancc of cconomic and legal principlcs in thc tcnns 
of a practical concordancc has bccn suggcstcd. 1 ''~ American Iiterature has statcd it 
would come to ovcrcornpcnsation bccausc among othcr things activc invcstors with 
a divcrsificd portfolio would havc about thc samc chanccs in thc long run to bc 
winncrs of or injurcd from inaccuratc capital markct information. 1" 11 An invcstor 
cannot bc dcprivcd of damagcs claims for inaccuratc capital markct inforrnation 
bccause hc or she achicvcd or, wherc appropriatc, would havc achicvcd a gain at 
a different time, with a different stock and indcpcndcnt from the infonnation bcing 
disputcd. The principlc of total rcparation of § 249 BGB is cxprcssion of thc prin-
ciplc of cqualizing justicc that fundamentally detincs law, which was alrcady spo-
kcn of by Aristotlc.'67 lnasmuch, U.S. criticism is not compatiblc with Gcnnan tort 
law, which is prcdominatcly bascd on reasonable compcnsation.11>K Thc approach 
from Drexl is also sophisticatcd, which rcquircs thc considcration of thc autono-
maus decision as further dcliberation critcria along with economic considcrations. 
Accordingly, unilateral mcasurcs arc not allowcd to kad to alternative dccision 
bcing takcn away from othcr markct participants. 1"'i As shown in thc legislative 
material for § 15 WpHG, lcgislators intcndcd that ad hoc publications contributc 
to ··markt!t participants posscssing markct relevant information as soon as possiblc 
so that thcy can makc appropriatc invcstmcnl dccisions."170 Thc normative cfti-
cicncy dcmands thc considcration of this valuc judgmcnt. 
., Darnage Claims with lnaccuratc Pcriodic Rccon.Jing dc! lege! jC:rc!nda 
With spccitic liability lcgislation for inaccurat-.: ad hoc publication according to 
*~ 3 7b. c WpHG, thc German kgislaturc entered into ncw tcrritory. In adJition. 
Art. 7 of thc Transparency Dircctivc rcquircs civi l law liability for im:om:ct scmi-
annual or annual tinancial rcports as weil as announccmcnts according lO thc rc-
spcctivc national rcgulations.~' 1 Thc lcgislaturc abstaincd from thc impkmcntatitm 
'"' lirunJmann. RahtdsL 6/ (IIJ97). pp423. 444 .:t sqq . 
.... langcvoort, )~ Ariz.l.Rcv. 639. 646. 650 ( I ~6). for tht:. argumcnt. 'iCC gcncrally S~häli:r. Ott. 
L~hrhuch d<!r iilwnumi.:n:ht!n Anu~vse de.\ l.il:ilrttdl(s (4th cd., 2005 ). pp 35 ct sqq. 
"': Aristotd.:s, "Nikomachi~hc Ethik" 5. Buch 7. Kap .. 1132b; Wcndchorsl. An\pntdt und :111.\ · 
Kil'ich ( 1999), pp 4 ct sqq.; Jans~n. Oie Strukwr J1!.\· llajiung ... redus (20l)J ). pp M'J ct sqq. 
'"" Weichen . Di!r Anl<!J.:<:r.rdwdt:'n h.:i fehlalwjtttr Kapitulrrwrkti,!/iJrmuti(m. up cit. p .30~ . 
,, .. ror his com:ept uf basi~.: dlkicncy. sec. Drcxl. /Jit• wirlsL·hu.ftlidlc S..Jhslht·.~timmung des J"l'r· 
hn.mchas ( 199H). pp 2U2 ct sqq . Prcvil)usly statcd tor comp<tition law sec Luk..:s. in FS Uöhm. ( 1965). 
PP IIJIJ. 225. 
I'U Ucgr. RegE 4. fHj, HT-Drucks. 14. HIJI7, r !(7 on ~ 15 Wpll(i (Liali~s aJdcd). ln thc gu~.ocrn-
11\~nral drall tor thc AnSV<.J. this proh:..:tiun purposc of § 15 is h ighllghr~J an..:w in Jdcn tLt..:al words. 
Compare Hcgr. RegE AnSVG, I:H -Drucks. 15!3174, p 34 right column. For this Mölkrsi l..:isch. m 
KK-JYpii(J (2007), §§ 37b . ..: marginal num~r 260. 
m Art. 7 of thc Transparcncy Dife\:tivc (Fn. 49) state.o;: ··Mcmbcr Stares ~hall ..:nsurc th;~t n.:spon-
sibility for the infonnation tu bc drawn up anJ maJc public in at.:cordancc w1th Artidcs 4. 5. tl und I o 
l i~:S at least with thc issucr or 1ls aJministrativc, managcmcnt or supcrvisury hoJacs and shull cnsurc 
thal thf!ir /ows. rl!gulutimr.r und a~Jmini.\lrtJli\ t! pro\'ision.~ 1)11 liability apply 10 !hl! issu~rs. th~ bod1~:s 
n:tt:rn:d to in this artidc or the pcrsons ~ponsibh! wirhin 1hc issucrs:· (itali~s aJdcd) . 
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of this norm in thc Transparcncy lmplcmcntation Actm without further justifying 
this rcnunciation in thc legal history. Because of the higher requiremcnts for intent 
and moral principlc violations, simply resorting to § 826 BGB is not sufficicnt. 
§ g23 par. 2 BGB in connection with § 400 AktG as weil only apply to willful 
actions. Thc lcgislaturc probably bclicvcd that thc currcnt vcrsion of §§ 93, 1 J 6 
AktG satis~cs thc implementation requirements. In contrast, however, the Euro-
pcan lcgislaturc mcntioncd just such an intcmal liability of thc companics against 
thc sharcholdcrs in the Amending Directivc 2006/46/EC for the Annual Account 
Dircctivc 78/660/EEC for liability for inaccurate financial statements,173 but did not 
in thc Transparcncy Directivc. 17~ In its case law for the cqual trcatment of malcs 
and fcmalcs, thc Europcan Court of Justice, at thc time, clcarly cxpandcd the rc-
quircmcnts for damagcs. m In Iegalliterature it is still being discussed, whcthcr the 
duty to crcatc announcements176, semiannual and annual financial reports approach~ 
es thc protcction capacity rcquircd by § 823 par. 2 BGB. 177 Thc German Fedcral 
Court of Justice had alrcady approvcd in the past the legal protection capacity of * 400 AktG. 17K 
Evcn if thc legal protection capacity requircd by § 823 par. 2 BGB would be 
approvcd for pcriodic publication, this will not be sufficient for thc implcmcnta-
tion of thc Dircctivc. According to consistent case-law from thc Europcan Court 
of Justicc. Dircctivcs must bc implcmcntcd clcarly and preciscly_IN A Iack of clcar 
rcquircmcnts on thc one hand would deter the injured party from suing and on thc 
orhcr hand would not clcarly and dcfinitively discourage thc injuring party. As lang 
as such a law is absent, thc cffcct lcading to prevcntion will not bc achievcd. This 
loopholc is also cconomically not dcsirable. 
' ·: Sec thc prcvious fn. 45. 
•·· Art. 50c ol Dirccti"c 7~/660iEC. impkmcnh.'\1 through Dirl!ctivc 2000i46IEC from 6. 14.2006. 
UJ Nr. l 22-J. statcs: "M..:mbcr Stares shall cnsure that their luws. rt!gulurivns und udministruriw pro-
''·'ions on hability apply to th~ mcmbers of thc administrati\-1.!, managcmcnt and su(>l:rvisory bo<.li~s 
rdi.:rn:d to in Art. 50b. tJI I.:(L~I tu1wrds tht: ,·ompuny. jiJr breud1 ()l the duty refi!rrt!J to in Art. 50h. ·• 
1 llalics atkkd). 
'•• l"onsc4ucntly MülbcrvStcup. WM ( 2005, pp 1633, 1653 support cxt~mal liability. 
I " I EU from 4.1 O. l'JH4. Case 1411<3, ECR 19~4. I a91 paragraphs 24. 2M - from Colson and Kamann; 
I:CJ from II.X . I')'JO, Cas~ C - 1771!SX, ECR 1990. 1-3941 paragraphs 23 ~:t S'l4· - Ockk.;:r; ECJ trom 
~.2~ . 1')')1, Casl' C-IXOIIJ5. ECR IY'17.1-2l'}5 paragraphs 20 ct S44· - Orachmpac:hl. 
,.,. Gruß. Kupitulnwrktrt:dlt (3nJ \!d .. 2U06). § 40 Börsü marginal number 4; Mock, in KK- J~jJ/Iv. 
12007 ). § J 7x marginal nurnbcr 37. 
' :· Cunccming scmiannual anJ annual rcports, thc rcgulation~ rcquiring a ··balancc-shcct-oath'" an: 
satd to havc su~h prull:ction capacity. so that private: partics havc a right to suc, ct: ~1ock. in : KK-
J~ji!IG. '-'P cit, § 37\· rnaq~inal numbcr 36. § 37w marginal numb\!r 41; !k·Jrnurr. ZIIR 170 (2006). 1}, 
2Y Cl Slj~.t . : lh:nnridts, in: rS Kollhoss.!r, (Bd . 2. 2004). PP 201. 214; rur § 331 UGB: Baumbach/Hopti 
~krkt, :l2th ~d .• (2006). § 331 UGB marginal numbcr I. 
•'• § X23 par. 2 BGB i.V.m. § -lOO AlttG. BGII from 19.9.2001. BGifZ 149, 10.20 c:t sqq.- ßrcmcr 
Vulkan. Re: Ad-hu,·-Puhli: ilüt: BCiH from 16. 12.2004. NJW {2005). pp 445. -149- EM.TV. 
•·.~ b;prcssly likc this from GA Til"l4!no. final claim from 1.23.20()1, Casc C-1~ /tN, ECR 2001, 
1-35-B marginal numbcr 35 ct sttq. · Transpan:ncy law in Dircctivc 93/13/EEC. Thc way from Mül-
b~rt. Stcup. W.\1 (2005). pp 16H. 1651 c:t S4'-l· is not passabl\!, wh ich is support an anulogy to §§ 37b . 
. nc Wpll<i. 
